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THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CONTESTATORY FEDERALISM 
JAMES A. GARDNER* 
ABSTRACT 
Madisonian theory holds that a federal division of power is 
necessary to the protection of liberty, but that federalism is a natu-
rally unstable form of government organization that is in constant 
danger of collapsing into either unitarism or fragmentation. Despite 
its inherent instability, this condition may be permanently main-
tained, according to Madison, through a constitutional design that 
keeps the system in equipoise by institutionalizing a form of perpet-
ual contestation between national and subnational governments. The 
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theory, however, does not specify how that contestation actually 
occurs, and by what means. 
This paper investigates Madison’s hypothesis by documenting the 
methods actually deployed on the ground to influence or to thwart 
national policy making used by subnational units in nine federal or 
quasi-federal states: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ger-
many, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. 
The study produces two notable findings. First, the evidence 
confirms Madison’s prediction that subnational units in federal 
states will from time to time assert themselves against national 
power—ambition does appear to counteract, or at least to be deployed 
against, ambition. Second, the data show strikingly that subnational 
units in federal states have energetically developed a great variety of 
methods to attempt to shape, influence, or thwart national policies. 
Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that subnational units have not 
confined themselves to the use of tools of influence provided by their 
constitutions, but have in many cases creatively developed new tools 
of influence outside of the formal constitutional scheme. This phe-
nomenon raises the possibility that Madison’s institutional pre-
scription for constitutional stabilization may have the perverse effect 
of creating the conditions for constitutional destabilization instead. 
This conclusion in turn throws doubt on the Madisonian premise 
that constitutions can, through careful engineering, be made to 
stabilize themselves at their initial design specifications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In one of the most consequential phrases ever uttered in the field 
of constitutional law, James Madison declared: “[a]mbition must be 
made to counteract ambition.”1 With this phrase—an adage that 
gave birth to the modern field of constitutional design2—Madison 
hypothesized that the inexorable pressure of human weakness 
would eventually preclude most government officials from comply-
ing with constitutionally prescribed limitations on their own power. 
From this premise, Madison went on to conclude that the only re-
liable way to stabilize constitutional divisions of authority over the 
long term was to structure power in a way that pits officials against 
one another.3 Thus, he predicted, a careful allocation of powers to 
different officials, holding different positions and portfolios and an-
swerable to different constituencies, could, if well executed, main-
tain a constitution in equilibrium at its design parameters through 
a well-crafted balance of perpetually opposed forces4—a system of 
so-called “checks and balances.”5 Madison prescribed this solution 
in two dimensions: horizontally in the form of separation of powers, 
and vertically in the form of federalism.6 I focus here on the latter, 
and the question I wish to take up is this: Was Madison correct? 
Can the countering of ambition by ambition stabilize the constitu-
tional division of authority between national and subnational gov-
ernments? 
Like all attractive theories, Madison’s theory of contestatory 
federalism is neat and tidy, with a happy ending. At the time he 
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). 
2. See generally THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM (Bernard 
Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., 1989). 
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 1, at 357-59 (James Madison).
4. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said in the context of horizontal separation of powers, 
the Constitution establishes a “finely wrought and exhaustively considered” division of power 
that must not be disturbed. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
5. The Framers themselves did not use this term, but it was adopted some time ago by 
the courts. The earliest reference to the term in a Supreme Court case dealing with an issue 
implicating federalism appears to be Amy v. Supervisors, 78 U.S. (6 Wall.) 136, 138 (1870). 
6. The combination of horizontal and vertical division of power institutionalized, for 
Madison, a “double security” for the liberty of the people. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 
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conceived it, however, it was almost entirely speculative; a federa-
tion structured in this way had never previously existed,7 and 
Madison’s account was based more on deduction from plausible first 
premises than on observation or experience. Today, more than two 
centuries later, a large majority of the world’s free population lives 
in federal states.8 Although the precise structures of these federa-
tions differ, they are clearly recognizable from Madison’s account; 
indeed, in some contemporary accounts, U.S. federalism provides 
the template against which all other federal systems may be eval-
uated.9 In light of this extensive experience, it is appropriate to 
inquire into the accuracy of Madison’s speculative analysis. In this 
paper, I do so by asking three questions. First, was Madison correct 
that contestation between national and subnational governments 
occurs in federal states? Second, if he was, by what means and 
methods does such contestation occur? Third, does such contestation 
7. THOMAS O. HUEGLIN & ALAN FENNA, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: A SYSTEMATIC IN-
QUIRY 84 (2d ed. 2015); FRANCECO PALERMO & KARL KÖSSLER, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: 
CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND CASE LAW 70-71 (2017); RONALD L. WATTS, COMPARING 
FEDERAL SYSTEMS 3 (3d ed. 2008). 
8. By my own back-of-the-envelope calculations, 79 percent of the world’s free population 
lives in federal states. To perform this calculation, I used the list of federal states provided 
in WATTS, supra note 7, at 12 tbl.2; the list of states deemed “[f]ree” in FREEDOM HOUSE, 
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2017, 20-24 (2017), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_ 
FIW_2017_Report_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XA2-5ZNZ]; and country population figures 
available at Worldometers, http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-
country/ [https://perma.cc/8E5E-8PF5]. For similar claims, see HUEGLIN & FENNA, supra note 
7, at 1, 69; WATTS, supra note 7, at 1; John Gerring, Strom C. Thacker & Carola Moreno, Are 
Federal Systems Better than Unitary Systems? 2 (paper presented at the American Political 
Science Association annual meeting, June 22, 2007), http://www.bu.edu/sthacker/files/2012/ 
01/Are-Federal-Systems-Better-than-Unitary-Systems.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PXH-M6HQ]. 
Much, of course, will depend upon how one identifies “federal” states and how one calculates 
which states are “free.” 
9. S. RUFUS DAVIS, THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE 121 (1978) (“It is the U.S. model which 
defines the conceptual starting-point” for designers of federal constitutions.); Thomas O. 
Hueglin, Comparing Federalism: Variations or Distinct Models?, in  FEDERAL DYNAMICS: 
CONTINUITY, CHANGE, AND THE VARIETIES OF FEDERALISM 27, 28 (Arthur Benz & Jörg 
Broschek eds., 2013) (arguing that the dominant view of federalism focuses on the United 
States, and that “[e]verything else, according to this view, amounts to incomplete or quasi-
federalism”); see also  IVO D. DUCHACEK, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: THE TERRITORIAL 
DIMENSION OF POLITICS 202 (1970) (“[The U.S. system] has acquired the reputation of a 
model.”); PALERMO & KÖSSLER, supra note 7, at 72 (identifying the United States as one of 
three archetypes of federal systems, along with Switzerland and Germany); ALFRED STEPAN, 
ARGUING COMPARATIVE POLITICS 192 (2001) (contending that the United States is the best 
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in fact, as Madison predicted, stabilize the constitutionally pre-
scribed allocation of power between the national and subnational 
levels? 
These questions have received surprisingly little systematic at-
tention. A few studies examine methods of intergovernmental 
conflict in single states, or at most in two states,10 but no study does 
so on a broadly comparative basis. Moreover, the single-country 
studies generally confine themselves to descriptive accounts of 
methods of intergovernmental relations, rarely relating the use of 
those methods to the heart of Madison’s theoretical project—the 
question of constitutional self-stabilization.11 
The present study fills that gap. Based on more than fifty in-
terviews with scholars and government officials in nine federal or 
quasi-federal12 states—Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
10. Works examining methods of subnational contestation in the United States include 
JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN 
A FEDERAL SYSTEM ch. 3 (2005); JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES 
PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING (2009); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & 
Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009); John Dinan, 
Shaping Health Reform: State Government Influence in the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, 41 PUBLIUS 395 (2011). Ardanaz, Leiras, and Tommasi address several methods of 
subnational contestation in Argentina. See Martín Ardanaz, Marcelo Leiras & Mariano 
Tommasi, The Politics of Federalism in Argentina and its Implications for Governance and 
Accountability, 53 WORLD DEV. 26, 27-30 (2014). Wright and Gardner have published studies 
on methods of intergovernmental contestation in Canada. See James A. Gardner, Canadian 
Federalism in Design and Practice: The Mechanics of a Permanently Provisional Constitution, 
9 PERSP. ON FEDERALISM 1 (2017); Wade K. Wright, The Political Safeguards of Canadian 
Federalism: The Intergovernmental Safeguards, 36 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 1 (2016). The only 
comparative study of which I am aware that focuses expressly on techniques of subnational 
contestation is a two-country study of the United States and Spain. See James A. Gardner & 
Antoni Abad I Ninet, Sustainable Decentralization: Power, Extraconstitutional Influence, and 
Subnational Symmetry in the United States and Spain, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 491 (2011). A 
recent volume contains a comprehensive multi-country study of intergovernmental relations 
in twelve federal states and the European Union (EU), but it consists of a series of single-
country studies and is not meant to be synthetic. See  INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN 
FEDERAL SYSTEMS: COMPARATIVE STRUCTURES AND DYNAMICS (Johanne Poirier et al. eds., 
2015). 
11. One of the few exceptions among the single-country studies is NUGENT, supra note 10, 
at 4-10. 
12. One of the recurring issues in the field of comparative federalism is defining what 
counts as a federation. Different scholars sometimes use very different classification systems. 
Compare, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, FEDERALISM (1995), with WATTS, supra note 7, at 12-13. I 
am inclined to agree with Palermo and Kössler that the search for an authoritative definition 
of federalism is a waste of time. See PALERMO & KÖSSLER, supra note 7, at 38. Accordingly, 
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Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States13—as 
well as extensive research in primary and secondary source ma-
terials from each state, this Article examines the tools, methods, 
and mechanisms that subnational units actually deploy to influence 
national political agendas, shape national policy making, and resist 
or undermine unwanted exercises of national power.14 The Article 
then goes on to examine whether the dynamic thus created succeeds 
in stabilizing the allocation of power between the national and sub-
national levels at the design parameters contemplated by the fed-
eral constitution. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets out the Madison-
ian theory of contestatory federalism. It describes Madison’s account 
of how liberty may be preserved by dividing governmental authority 
among different power centers, highlights Madison’s lack of atten-
tion to how his theory of mutual checking and contestation might be 
operationalized in practice, and probes some of the potential weak-
nesses in Madison’s conception of constitutional self-stabilization. 
Part II reports the results of my field research by providing a 
thorough inventory, along with illustrative examples, of methods of 
subnational contestation actually used in the federal states under 
study. This compilation produces two notable findings. First, it 
fulfilling some definition of federalism, and thus I am willing to call them “quasi-federal.” 
Again, however, I do not believe there is much significance to the terminology. All nine states 
are decentralized to some extent; in all, subnational units enjoy some degree of autonomy, and 
such autonomy is either constitutionalized or the outcome of constitutionally prescribed 
procedures. That is sufficient for my purposes. 
13. The interviews are actually with individuals from the first eight of these states. As a 
specialist in U.S. constitutional law with thirty years’ experience, I have drawn primarily on 
my own experience and prior work in analyzing federalism in the United States. 
14. I focus here almost exclusively on the means by which subnational units in federations 
attempt to get their way rather than on how national governments do so. I maintain this focus 
for two reasons. First, this seems like the more interesting question. National governments 
in federations seem to have all the advantages: greater size, a greater population, far more 
resources, and so forth. Thus, the interesting question is not how national governments get 
their way—that they should get their way seems logical—but how subnational units can ever 
do so given the seeming disparities of power and resources. Second, generally speaking, the 
way that national governments exercise their power is usually pretty straightforward: they 
just do it. In contrast, subnational units often have to think tactically and creatively to 
accomplish their ends. To the extent that national governments do not simply do what they 
want—for example, they voluntarily engage in extensive consultation, as in Germany and 
Switzerland, see infra notes 287-88 and accompanying text, or negotiation, as in Canada. See 
infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text. That behavior will be exposed by consideration of 
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confirms Madison’s prediction that checking and contestation will 
occur in federal states. In fact, the study shows not only that subna-
tional units in all nine federal states push back against national 
power from time to time, but that in some states they do so regu-
larly and with considerable effectiveness. Second, it demonstrates 
that subnational units in the federal states studied here have from 
time to time resorted with great creativity to an enormous variety 
of methods to attempt to shape, influence, or thwart national pol-
icies. These tools of influence range from openly defiant methods, 
such as threatening secession or refusing to obey national laws or 
orders of national courts; to surreptitious undermining of national 
policies through uncooperative implementation of national law; to 
coordinated subnational occupation of policy space left vacant by 
national governments; to politically oriented mobilization of popu-
lar opinion; to more cooperative and routinized methods such as 
lobbying, negotiation, and ministerial consultation. Intergovern-
mental contestation not only occurs, but is occasionally waged with 
great vigor and creativity. 
Part III takes up the question of constitutional stabilization by 
analyzing the extent to which the tools of contestation identified in 
Part II are among those affirmatively provided, or at least contem-
plated, by the constitutions of the federations in which the tools are 
used. Although constitutions authorize many of the tools that sub-
national units deploy, the evidence shows that several widely used 
tools are clearly unauthorized, and many others press so hard 
against the boundaries of what might be constitutionally contem-
plated as to raise significant doubts about their constitutionality. 
These findings suggest that Madison may have seriously underesti-
mated the strength of the incentives facing government officials, 
who seem willing not only to innovate within the bounds of constitu-
tional authority to get their way, but also to go outside those bounds 
when the tools of contestation offered by the constitutional plan do 
not provide the desired degree of efficacy. 
All this raises the intriguing possibility that Madison’s theory of 
contestatory federalism may be far more potent than he anticipated. 
Madison argued that a contestatory system of federally divided pow-
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a process of dynamic self-equilibration.15 That may occur. On the 
other hand, it appears that on some occasions government officials 
wish so strongly to prevail in their struggles against one another 
that they seek advantage wherever they can find it, including by 
resort to extraconstitutional methods. In these situations, the con-
stitutionally induced struggle that Madison believed would stabilize 
the constitutional allocation of power may actually destabilize it, as 
government officials attempt through informal or surreptitious 
means to alter or bend the constitution to achieve their own goals.16 
This phenomenon in turn raises important questions about the 
binding effect of constitutions on official behavior and the capacity 
of constitutions to stabilize themselves at their initial design 
specifications, or indeed at any particular point of constitutional 
evolution.17 
I. THE THEORY OF CONTESTATORY FEDERALISM 
Theories of federalism are inherently theories of balance or equi-
librium.18 Federalism divides official power among two levels of 
government, each of which is granted some measure of autonomy.19 
Different polities may choose to divide power in this way for 
15. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
16. The theory of practice-driven informal constitutional change predicts this. For an 
overview of that theory and how it operates, see generally James A. Gardner, Practice-Driven 
Changes to Constitutional Structures of Governance, 69 ARK. L. REV. 335 (2016). 
17. For a more detailed application of this analytic approach to the Canadian Consti-
tution, see Gardner, Canadian Federalism, supra note 10. 
18. PRESTON KING, FEDERALISM AND FEDERATION 62 (1982); Arthur Benz & César Colino, 
Constitutional Change in Federations—A Framework for Analysis, 21 REGIONAL & FED. STUD. 
381, 387 (2011); César Colino, Varieties of Federalism and Propensities for Change, in FED-
ERAL DYNAMICS, supra note 9, at 57; Kathleen Thelen & Sebastian Karcher, Resilience and 
Change in Federal Institutions: The Case of the German Federal Council, in  FEDERAL DY-
NAMICS, supra note 9, at 119. In the United States, federalism is of course understood as part 
of the constitutional system of “checks and balances” that also includes horizontal separation 
of powers. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
19. See, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 5 (1987) (describing federalism 
as a “ombination of self-rule and shared rule”); WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM 11 (1964) 
(defining federalism to include the principle of “some guarantee ... of the autonomy of each 
government in its own sphere”); K. C. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 10-11 (3d ed. 1953) 
(defining the federal principle as “the method of dividing powers so that the general and 
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different reasons,20 but in no case is the division undertaken in the 
expectation that it will be temporary. Like all constitutions, federal 
constitutions arrive with a presumption of endurance,21 and it is 
clear from their choice that the polities that create federal states are 
not indifferent as to whether the state remains federal, collapses 
into unitarism, or splinters into fragments. In some cases, perhaps 
many, the promise of authority and autonomy to constituent units 
characteristic of federalism is considered to be an indispensable 
term of the “federal bargain” that makes formation of the state pos-
sible in the first instance.22 Whatever the good to which any par-
ticular federal system aspires, it is by definition a good available 
only so long as power is, and remains, appropriately divided. 
Nevertheless, it is far from self-evident that a division of gov-
ernmental power on a federal model will in fact endure. History 
suggests that the choice of a federal form of organization entails 
considerable risk: according to one count, “twenty-seven of the forty-
four federations formed in the last two hundred years... have failed 
either by breaking apart” or by collapsing into unitarism.23 Conse-
quently, a critical question facing federal theory concerns the means 
by which a division of authority and autonomy that is recognizably 
federal may be sustained indefinitely. 
20. For example, some polities may adopt federalism for the protection of individual 
liberty, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), while others may do so to accommodate 
ethnonational diversity within the state. See  HUEGLIN & FENNA, supra note 7, at 1-4; 
PALERMO & KÖSSLER, supra note 7, at 34-35. 
21. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to ... secure 
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Con-
stitution.”); Pmbl., CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.) (“[S]ecure the blessings of 
liberty to ourselves, to our posterity, and to all men of the world who wish to dwell on 
argentine soil.”). 
22. RIKER, supra note 19, at 12; Benz & Colino, supra note 18, at 383; Miknail Filippov 
& Olga Shvetsova, Federalism, Democracy, and Democratization, in  FEDERAL DYNAMICS, 
supra note 9, at 168, 170; Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Role of the 
Judiciary, in  THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS, 142, 143-44 (Keith E. 
Whittington et al. eds., 2008). 
23. JONATHAN LEMCO, POLITICAL STABILITY IN FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS 1 (1991). These 
include, for example, Austria-Hungary, the Central African Federation, Ethiopia, the Mali 
Federation, Uganda, and the United Arab Republic. Id. at 77. Since Lemco published his 
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A. The Madisonian Theory of Perpetual Contestation 
The most elaborately worked out account of how a federal division 
of authority may endure, and one of the most influential, is James 
Madison’s. Madison’s theory begins with political psychology: hu-
man beings, Madison argues, strive to be virtuous, but few have the 
strength to resist temptation, and those able to do so initially are 
generally unable to sustain the effort for very long.24 Among those 
who hold official power, the capitulation to temptation generally 
appears in the form of “ambition,” and specifically the ambition 
among officials to augment their own power.25 Thus, writes Madi-
son, we may expect in every political system that virtually all who 
hold power will eventually seek more of it.26 In a system in which 
power is divided, this will inevitably mean seeking to appropriate 
and accumulate powers held by others.27 Such accumulation of 
power is dangerous, he argues, because it creates the conditions in 
which liberty may be lost to tyranny.28 
This premise led Madison to seek institutional solutions to what 
he deemed an irremediable flaw in human character.29 One solution 
that Madison immediately rejected is the solution of constitutional 
limits, or what we think of today as “constitutionalism.”30 A consti-
tution, according to the Enlightenment theory of political legitimacy 
inherited by the American Founders, is a set of commands from the 
24. Hence, for Madison, centralization of power is “the very definition of tyranny”—no one 
can long resist its temptations. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 1, at 336 (James 
Madison). 
25. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 48, 51, supra note 1, at 344, 356 (James Madison). 
26. Id. at 344-45, 347, 356-58. 
27. As Madison argued, “power is of an encroaching nature.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, 
supra note 1, at 343 (James Madison). 
28. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 1, at 130-36 (James Madison). 
29. Id.; see also Robert E. Goodin, Institutions and Their Design, in  THE THEORY OF 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 1, 41 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996) (arguing that institutions should be 
designed in light of “the admixture of motives that moves most people, at least in most so-
cieties relevantly similar to our own,” and that “[c]lassic models of separation of powers,” 
including “checks and balances between branches of government ... constitute one style of 
reaction”). 
30. STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 12-13 (1996) (stating that 
American constitutionalism is based on the idea of a constitution as “a single law that had a 
special status as a paramount or fundamental law”; “[t]he idea of conducting government 
under law is the core of American constitutionalism”). The link between federalism and 
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sovereign people.31 Consequently, an initial constitutional division 
of power might sustain itself through the force of habitual obedience 
on the part of government officials. Madison dismissed this solution 
out of hand, deriding it as reliance on “parchment barriers.”32 
Madison’s solution was not to resist, but to exploit human nature: 
if the ambition that afflicts office holders drives them to ignore 
constitutionally established boundaries of authority, then those 
boundaries may nonetheless survive if “[a]mbition [is] made to coun-
teract ambition” in a system of mutual checks and balances.33 In 
such a system, each power center must be provided with means of 
“self-defence” adequate to fight off incursions by other power cen-
ters.34 By so doing, Madison contends, “the interior structure of the 
government [is contrived such] that its several constituent parts 
may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other 
in their proper places.”35 What Madison envisions, then, is a consti-
tutional system of divided powers that maintains itself at its own 
design specifications through the construction of a dynamic equi-
librium—an equilibrium maintained by a perpetual contest for pow-
er among multiple power centers, none of which is able fully or 
permanently to subdue the others.36 
B. The Problem of Methods of Contestation 
Suppose Madison was right in principle: In a constitutional sys-
tem of divided power, human nature furnishes power holders with 
incentives to engage in a kind of perpetual contest with other power 
holders. Still, it is not at all clear how such a system might operate 
in practice. By what means will such contestation occur, and with 
what tools? Here, unfortunately, Madison’s account runs out. There 
31. This is the theory set out most prominently in JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF 
GOVERNMENT (1690), especially in sections 4, 87, 89, 95-99, 132, and 134-142, and largely 
echoed in concise form in THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 1, at 343 (James Madison). 
33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 356 (James Madison). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 355. 
36. See  ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION 3 (2011); Peter C. 
Ordeshook, Some Rules of Constitutional Design, in LIBERALISM AND THE ECONOMIC ORDER 
198, 204-05 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1993); Thomas Schwartz, Publius and Public 
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are, nevertheless, strong indications in The Federalist that both 
Madison and Hamilton believed that states would respond to in-
cursions by the national government principally by resorting to the 
two tactics of revolutionary resistance with which the Founders 
were most familiar: remonstrance, or protest; and if that failed, re-
sort to arms.37 The first major instance in which American states 
openly and officially opposed a national policy—the Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, respectively38—was indeed 
a classic example of official remonstrance. Later, of course, some 
states engaged in armed resistance to the national government 
during the U.S. Civil War. 
For the most part, however, American states have not used the 
toolkit of revolutionary opposition contemplated by the founders; 
by the mid-twentieth century, observers noted that intergovern-
mental relations in the United States—and in federal states else-
where—were characterized as much as or more by cooperation than 
by open conflict.39 The emergence of intergovernmental cooperation 
appeared to pose an unusually potent threat to the Madisonian the-
ory of self-equilibration, which relies on conflict to maintain the 
constitutionally prescribed balance of power.40 Cooperation, in con-
trast, opens up the prospect of collusive alteration of constitutional 
boundaries.41 
37. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), NO. 46 (James Madison). To be 
sure, it was not anticipated that state resistance to national power would be seen as necessary 
often, if ever. Madison argued that the primary form of restraint on Congress would be self-
imposed due to the predominantly local attachments of the members. THE FEDERALIST NO. 
46, supra note 1, at 331-33, 35-36 (James Madison). Resistance would be a distinctly inferior 
auxiliary protection for the states. Nevertheless, as Kramer observes, “[s]tate legislatures will 
control the federal government ... by outside agitation.” Larry Kramer, Understanding 
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1515 (1994). 
38. Gen. Assemb. Res. of Dec. 3, 1799 (Ky. 1799), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/ 
kenres.asp [https://perma.cc/3XB7-Y76M]; Sen. Res. of Dec. 24, 1798 (Va. 1798), http://avalon. 
law.yale.edu/18th_century/virres.asp [https://perma.cc/LJX5-NLU6]. 
39. See, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 79-85 
(1966); MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 4-7 (1966). 
40. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
41. A few scholars have argued that we should not be worried about such collusion, and 
that governments in federal systems should be permitted to engage in Coasean swapping of 
authority. See, e.g., ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN ch. 7 (2011); Aziz 
Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1599-1606, 1610 
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In light of this experience, some theorists, such as Albert Dicey 
and Kenneth Wheare, argued, contrary to Madison, that constitu-
tional allocations of power could be maintained and intergovern-
mental disputes resolved in practice only through the intervention 
of a disinterested umpire in the form of a constitutional court.42 In 
an influential 1954 article, Herbert Wechsler rejected this view and 
strongly endorsed the pure Madisonian model in his theory of 
“political safeguards” of federalism.43 According to Wechsler, judicial 
intervention was unnecessary to preserve the constitutional balance 
of power between the state and national governments because the 
Constitution furnishes states with tools adequate to protect and ad-
vance their interests in the arena of national policy making.44 
Wechsler disagreed with Madison, however, as to which tools these 
were; in Wechsler’s view, the primary tool available to states to 
accomplish their goals was their representation in the Senate.45 
Nearly a half-century later, Larry Kramer argued forcefully that 
Wechsler was right, but for the wrong reasons.46 Wechsler was 
correct, Kramer maintained, that states have adequate tools with 
which to protect themselves and to advance their interests as 
against the national government, and that judicial intervention to 
enforce the constitutional allocation of power between the national 
rules described by Coase, the federal arrangement has a third-party beneficiary: the people, 
whose liberty the federal balance of power is meant to protect. See id. at 1604. 
42. A.V.DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 87-88 (8th 
ed. 1915); WHEARE, supra note 19, at 60-61. For similar views, see EDWARD MCWHINNEY, 
COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: STATES ’ RIGHTS AND NATIONAL POWER 21-35 (2d ed. 1965); 
WATTS, supra note 7, at 6; Carl Friedrich, The Political Theory of Federalism, in FEDERALISM 
AND SUPREME COURTS AND THE INTEGRATION OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 17, 18 (Edward McWhinney 
& Pierre Pescatore eds., 1973). 
43. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 544-47 
(1954); see also JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: 
A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 171-259 (1980). 
44. Wechsler, supra note 43, at 558-60. This idea, initially stated briefly by Wechsler, was 
later developed at much greater length by Jesse Choper. CHOPER, supra note 43, at 171-259. 
45. Wechsler, supra note 43, at 546-47. Wechsler also believed that state influence in the 
selection of Representatives and the President provided further avenues of influence over 
national policy and actions. Id. at 547-58. 
46. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 219 (2000) (“Wechsler's core insight is still valid: The 
structure of American politics does offer states considerable protection from federal over-
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and subnational levels was both unnecessary and largely ineffec-
tive.47 But those tools, Kramer went on, did not include the formal 
institutional role of states in Congress identified by Wechsler; rath-
er, Kramer explained, states had come to exert influence in the 
arena of national policy making primarily through the agency of 
political parties.48 
On this view, strong, consolidated, and national parties cross 
lines of jurisdiction established by the Constitution to create a net-
work that orients and unifies policy commitments at all levels of 
government.49 Party members at each level within this network 
labor for the success of party members and programs at all levels.50 
This system of “mutual dependency” within national party net-
works best explains, argues Kramer, how state officials influence 
their national counterparts, and how they remain able to do so even 
in the face of a huge expansion of national power accomplished over 
the course of the twentieth century.51 
What is especially striking about Kramer’s account is his con-
clusion that American states have pursued decidedly Madisonian 
aspirations—self-defense, influence, even expansion of their own 
powers—through the use of a tool—political parties—that lies en-
tirely outside the constitutional plan.52 Indeed, the rise of political 
parties was not only unforeseen by the founders, but a prospect that 
they openly reviled.53 At the same time, contemporary analysts of 
federalism, especially political scientists, have noted the develop-
ment of many other mediating structures and practices in federal 
states through which subnational influence may be exerted on na-
tional policy making. An entire subfield devoted to intergovernmen-
tal relations has documented numerous ways in which subnational 
47. See id. at 234-52. 
48. See id. at 276-78. 
49. See id. at 278. 
50. Id. at 279. 
51. Id. To be sure, Kramer does not view party channels as the only method by which 
states can influence national policy; he also describes mechanisms of administration, struc-
ture, and culture. See Kramer, supra note 37, at 1542-1559. 
52. See Kramer, supra note 46, at 276, 285-86. 
53. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE 
OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840 9 (1969); see also George Washington, Farewell 
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officials and even lower-level state bureaucrats have assumed roles 
in the formulation and administration of national policy.54 
Although these accounts do useful work, there is nevertheless a 
distinct lack of close or systematic attention paid to the mechanisms 
and tools that governments in federal states actually employ to seek 
influence and advantage, and to defend themselves against incur-
sion by other governments in the course of intrafederal competition. 
The theorists discussed above suggest several different avenues by 
which subnational units might project influence to the national lev-
el: public protest and armed resistance (Madison),55 litigation in a 
constitutional court (Dicey, Wheare),56 representation in a second 
national legislative chamber (Wechsler),57 and the exploitation of 
political party channels (Kramer).58 But are these the methods in 
fact used by subnational units in federal states and, if so, are they 
the only methods? Do subnational units typically deploy a single 
strategy to influence national policy, or do they use multiple strat-
egies, and are these strategies the same in all federal states? These 
questions are taken up in Part II. 
C. The Problem of Constitutional Stabilization 
A second question raised by Madison’s theory of contestatory 
federalism is whether it actually works. As shown in detail below, 
contestation occurs, across a wide range of issues, and makes use of 
a great variety of tools of influence. But does this contestation in 
fact stabilize the constitutional allocation of powers, as Madison 
hypothesized? There are reasons for doubt. 
As explained above, the Madisonian model contends that basic 
constitutional allocations of power cannot be stabilized merely 
54. The American Political Science Association has an entire section dedicated to the 
study of federalism titled Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. See Federalism & 
Intergovernmental Relations (Section 1), AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N (2018), https://www.apsanet. 
org/section1 [https://perma.cc/9LKZ-AMXB]. For an overview of recent developments in the 
field, see generally, for example, Greg Goelzhauser & Shanna Rose, The State of American 
Federalism 2016-2017: Policy Reversals and Partisan Perspectives on Intergovernmental 
Relations, 47 PUBLIUS 285 (2017). 
55. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
56. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
57. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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through official obedience to constitutional boundaries.59 Instead, it 
predicts that constitutional stabilization may by achieved by pro-
viding officials embedded within one level of government the tools 
necessary to struggle successfully with their counterparts at the 
other level.60 Thus, a successful, sustainable federalism would seem 
to require careful calibration of the tools and levers of powers to be 
made available to each level of government to ensure (1) that the 
battle is fought to a draw, and (2) that the predicted stalemate 
settles in at the desired equilibrium point. 
But if a contestatory system, by pitting ambition against ambi-
tion, provides actors with incentives to struggle against—and 
equally importantly, to prevail over—their constitutional opponents, 
is there any reason to suppose that those actors will limit them-
selves in the heat of battle to the portfolio of powers, tools, and 
techniques furnished by the constitution? Would they not have the 
incentive to cheat—or less pejoratively, to “innovate”—by developing 
and deploying new and different methods of influence that might 
offer a greater chance of success than the methods to which the 
constitution would otherwise confine them? The root problem of 
constitutional design on this account is, after all, the unreliability 
of voluntary obedience by government officials to the constitution’s 
“parchment barriers.”61 The model of contestatory governance offers 
itself as a solution to this problem. But if constitutional actors can-
not be relied upon to observe constitutional limitations on their pow-
ers in the first instance, there seems to be little reason to presume 
that they will observe constitutional limitations on the means and 
methods of intergovernmental contestation in the course of strug-
gling for ascendency with other constitutional actors. 
As the great twentieth-century political scientist Elmer Schatt-
schneider famously observed, actors engaged in political struggle 
have constant, powerful incentives to manipulate the dimensions of 
the contest, and the fora in which it is fought, in ways that will in-
crease their likelihood of success.62 Or, as Daryl Levinson has more 
59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 357-59 (James Madison). 
60. See id. 
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 1, at 343 (James Madison). 
62. E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 8 (1960) (“It may be said ... that 
men of affairs do in fact make an effort to control the scope of conflict though they usually 




   
 
  
   
  
  




       
2018] THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONTESTATORY FEDERALISM 525 
recently put the point, if “[c]onstitutional stability depends on the 
willingness of the losers to limit their competitive efforts to the 
ordinary processes” provided by the constitution, why would we not 
expect constitutional actors engaged in political struggle to “carry 
the battle beyond the bounds of ordinary politics to the constitu-
tional level”?63 Why, that is, would they not attempt to alter or 
evade constitutional limits to improve their prospects of victory?64 
Just because a constitution succeeds in creating a struggle does not 
necessarily mean that the constitution will succeed in dictating the 
means by which that struggle is conducted.65 
If this is correct, then contestatory constitutional systems may 
suffer from an inherent defect.66 Such systems, intended to stabilize 
constitutions against immediate defections from the design plan, 
may well incentivize other kinds of defections further down the road 
that could lead in the long run to permanent alteration of the con-
stitutional design.67 A system designed to address the problem of 
disobedience at one point may thus encourage it at another, and 
with potentially comparable consequences.68 
Much contemporary scholarship on federalism suggests that this 
concern is more than merely theoretical.69 With notable consistency, 
federalism scholars tend to describe federal systems not as static, or 
as held in place by carefully equilibrated forces, but as in a state of 
constant motion. “[F]ederal systems,” it is said, “are highly dynam-
ic,”70 with “the various parts of the system ... in continuous inter-
action.”71 As a result, “[f]ederal relations are fluctuating relations in 
the very nature of things.”72 “[F]ederal systems,” in other words, 
63. Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional 
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 705 (2011). 
64. See id. 
65. Cf. id. 
66. See Goodin, supra note 29, at 40-41 (describing the potential defect of a separation of 
powers). 
67. See DAVIS, supra note 9, at 146-47. 
68. See id. 
69. See, e.g., CARL J. FRIEDRICH, TRENDS OF FEDERALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE  7 
(1968). 
70. Arthur Benz, German Dogmatism and Canadian Pragmatism? Stability and Constitu-
tional Change in Federal Systems, INSTITUT FÜR POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT, polis Nr. 65/2008, at 
1; see also Benz & Colino, supra note 18, at 381. 
71. M. J. C. VILE, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 3 (1961). 
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“are permanently in motion,”73 “undergoing a perpetual process of 
evolution and adaptation.”74 Most importantly, what moves in fed-
eral systems, according to Judith Resnik, is the most basic, defining 
feature of any federal regime: “competencies are always in motion, 
and in more than one direction.”75 
Observers who take this view typically trace the dynamism and 
instability of the federal allocation of power to its contestatory de-
sign features. Intergovernmental contestation places great pressure 
on the stability of federal regimes76: “the incentive to deviate from 
the division of authority,” argues Jenna Bednar, “is inescapably 
built in to the federal structure.”77 Because the system contemplates 
that national and subnational actors will compete against each oth-
er, “[t]he constitutional allocation of competences ... is particularly 
prone to entrepreneurial redefinition.”78 Constitutional actors, in 
other words, have an incentive to “try to shift the balance [of consti-
tutional authority] incrementally in a direction favourable to them,” 
thereby inducing a form of “authority migration.”79 When govern-
ment officials become adept players of this game, “assignments of 
73. Arthur Benz & Jörg Broschek, Federal Dynamics: Introduction, in FEDERAL DYNAMICS, 
supra note 9, at 2. 
74. Eugénie Brouillet, Canadian Federalism and the Principle of Subsidiarity: Should We 
Open Pandora’s Box?, 54 SUP. CT. L. REV. 601, 606 (2011). 
75. Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)’ Forms and Norms: Contesting Rights, De-Essentializing 
Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing Accommodations, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 
363, 368 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014); see also DAVIS, supra note 9, at 146-
47 (“However power is divided in a political system ... the fact of association inevitably 
generates both intended and unintended relations.... [It is impossible] to insulate ... a ‘division 
of power’ against unintended interactions.”). 
76. Nathalie Behnke & Arthur Benz, The Politics of Constitutional Change Between 
Reform and Evolution, 39 PUBLIUS 213, 213 (2009). 
77. JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION 63 (2009). 
78. Jörg Broschek, Conceptualizing and Theorizing Constitutional Change in Federal 
Systems: Insights from Historical Institutionalism, 21 REGIONAL &FED.STUD. 539, 548 (2011). 
79. Benz & Colino, supra note 18, at 381; see also WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON, FEDERALISM 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 11-12 (1956) (“[I]n a federal government the problem is even 
more acute because the distribution of powers between states and nation ... gives rise to 
demands for shifts in the allocation of functions from one government to the other.”); Ralph 
J. K. Chapman, Structure, Process and the Federal Factor: Complexity and Entanglement in 
Federations, in COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM AND FEDERATION 69, 71 (Michael Burgess & Alain-
G. Gagnon eds., 1993) (“The Actors are continuously involved in mutual transfers creating 
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powers and competences have to be continuously renegotiated.”80 
The end result, as Edward McWhinney wrote more than a half-
century ago, is that in all federal states there is a “contrast between 
the constitution as originally written and the actual working consti-
tution.”81 This contrast can be severe.82 
In the end, then, the struggle summoned into being by the 
Madisonian model of federalism for the purpose of achieving self-
stabilization might produce instead conditions conducive to self-
destabilization.83 If so, then the very idea of constitutional sta-
bility—indeed, of the capacity of constitutions to constrain govern-
ment action—may require serious rethinking.84 
To help answer these questions, I turn now to a close, empirical 
examination of how intergovernmental contestation is actually 
practiced by subnational units in the modern federal state. 
II. AN INVENTORY OF METHODS OF SUBNATIONAL CONTESTATION 
Theorists commonly distinguish between two different models 
of federalism. In one model, described variously as “dual,” “coordi-
nate,” or “legislative federalism,”85 and of which the United States 
is said to be the paradigm, “discrete policy areas are assigned to 
the respective levels of government, with each level then being 
sovereign within its own policy fields.”86 In the other model, some-
times called “integrated” or “administrative” federalism, and exemp-
lified by Germany, both levels of government share duties across all 
or nearly all policy fields.87 However, the national government 
provides “overarching policy guidance for the federation, while the 
80. Benz, supra note 70, at 1. 
81. MCWHINNEY, supra note 42, at 12. 
82. See Gerald Baier, The Courts, the Constitution, and Dispute Resolution, in CANADIAN 
FEDERALISM: PERFORMANCE, EFFECTIVENESS, AND LEGITIMACY 79, 79 (Herman Bakvis & 
Grace Skogstad eds., 3d ed. 2012) (“Canada’s federal system features a rather large gap 
between the jurisdictional map of the written constitution and the actual activities of its 
governments.”); Jan Erk, “Uncodified Workings and Unworkable Codes”: Canadian Federal-
ism and Public Policy, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 441, 456 (2006) (“The written constitution of the 
Canadian federation is of limited use in explaining how the federal system works.”). 
83. VERMEULE, supra note 36, at 102. 
84. See id. 
85. HUEGLIN & FENNA, supra note 7, at 136. 
86. Id. 
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subnational governments are assigned the implementation and ad-
ministration” of policies established at the national level.88 Both 
kinds of federalism confer (or in principle may confer) on subna-
tional units considerable authority and capacity for autonomous 
decision making, but they differ significantly in the relation of sub-
national to national power and in the kinds of discretion that sub-
national units in the two systems are free to exercise.89 
Although this dual classification oversimplifies and to a great 
extent exaggerates the differences among federal systems,90 the 
distinction it draws between subnational independence and inte-
gration is a useful one, not only to help orient thinking about the 
structure of federal systems but also for the purpose of contemplat-
ing subnational power and the ways in which it may be exercised. 
To the extent that subnational units may in principle pursue their 
interests and influence the exercise of national power in more ways 
than one, the mechanisms of potential influence may usefully be 
considered to lie along a spectrum extending from more defiant to 
more conciliatory, from more aggressive to more diplomatic, and 
from more independent of the national government to more in-
tegrated with or internal to its activities.91 
In this Part, I develop and lay out an inventory of tactics to which 
subnational units in federal states might resort. The inventory 
consists of a simple collection of all tactics that my research showed 
subnational units in the states under study to have in fact deployed 
at one time or another. These tactics are arrayed along the spectrum 
described above, from most defiant and independent, to most co-
operative and integrated. What we will see tends to validate a prop-
osition recently stated by Moisés Naím about the way in which what 
he calls “micropowers” manage to get their way against much more 
88. Id. 
89. See id. 
90. PALERMO & KÖSSLER, supra note 7, at 38-47. 
91. Compare Raphael Minder & Patrick Kingsley, Spain Dismisses Catalonia Government 
After Region Declares Independence, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/10/27/world/europe/spain-catalonia-puigdemont.html [https://perma.cc/Y3E4-S7ME] 
(reporting on the nonviolent dissolution of the Catalan parliament following Catalonia’s 
referendum), with  WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION 
CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1816-1836, at 248, 250, 255, 263, 267, 275 (1966) (describ-
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powerful opponents: “[t]hey wear down, impede, undermine, sab-
otage, and outflank the mega-players in ways that the latter, for all 
their vast resources, find themselves ill-equipped and ill-prepared 
to resist.”92 
In this regard, I note that there is no internal contradiction in 
saying that subnational governments may engage in “conflict” or 
“contestation” through cooperative or collaborative means. Accord-
ing to Madison, the key variable is the pursuit of ambition, and 
ambitions may be pursued by almost any means that circumstances 
happen to afford.93 Thus, it may be useful to think about these tac-
tics as simply different means by which subnational units attempt 
to achieve their goals in relation to national policy. In any case, as 
Morton Grodzins long ago argued, even cooperative federalism is 
often best understood as a form of “[a]ntagonistic ... cooperation” in 
which subnational units are constantly angling to achieve their own 
goals;94 it is, in Peter Leslie’s words, a form of “policy-making by 
thrust and riposte.”95 
The full inventory of subnational tactics is summarized in Table 
1. The Sections following describe the tactics more fully and provide 
illustrative examples. 
92. MOISÉS NAÍM, THE END OF POWER:FROM BOARDROOMS TO BATTLEFIELDS AND CHURCH-
ES TO STATES, WHY BEING IN CHARGE ISN’T WHAT IT USED TO BE 52 (2013). 
93. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 356 (James Madison). 
94. GRODZINS, supra note 39, at 389; see also Ivo D. Duchacek, Antagonistic Cooperation: 
Territorial and Ethnic Communities, 7 FEDERALISM & ETHNICITY 3, 27-28 (1977); Roland 
Lhotta & Julia von Blumenthal, Intergovernmental Relations in the Federal Republic of 
Germany: Complex Co-Operation and Party Politics, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN 
FEDERAL SYSTEMS, supra note 10, at 206, 211 (adding the term “consent-seeking competi-
tion”); Bishwapriya Sanyal, Antagonistic Cooperation: A Case Study of Nongovernmental 
Organizations, Government and Donors’ Relationships in Income-Generating Projects in 
Bangladesh, 19 WORLD DEV. 1367, 1374 (1991). 
95. PETER M. LESLIE, FEDERAL STATE, NATIONAL ECONOMY 66 (1987). 
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Table 1: Methods of Subnational Contestation 
More defiant Secession Actual secession, threatened secession, talk of secession 
Violent resistance Actual violence, threats of violence 
Defiance 
Strong defiance: refusal to 
comply, attempts to undermine; 
weak defiance: half-hearted 
enforcement, uncooperative 
implementation 
Invocation of third-party 
coercive processes 
Actual or threatened litigation in 
national constitutional court; 
appeals to supranational 
authorities 
Withholding cooperation Refusal of national requests for assistance 
More neutral, 
independent Independent use of assigned 
powers 
Unilateral exercise of 
autonomous power; subnational 
cooperation and harmonization 
of policy; reverse preemption; 
power entrepreneurialism 
Negotiation and bargaining 
Demands for greater autonomy; 
clientelism; multilateral or 
bilateral negotiation; negotiation 
over constitutional terms 
Influence in federal domestic 
policy making 
Direct participation in 
federal lawmaking 
Subnational assent required; 
introduce measures directly into 
national parliament; invocation 
of national direct democratic 
processes 
Indirect influence in federal 
legislatures 
Control or influence over second 
chamber; formal lobbying 
Political influence through 
parties 
Exploitation of boundary-
crossing party connections 
Mobilization of popular opin-
ion 
Public relations; public shaming 
or condemnation 
Influence on legislation 
through executive 
Intergovernmental consultation; 
ministerial level contacts; 
executive federalism 
Influence on federal 
administration 
Intergovernmental consultation; 





Participation in foreign policy 
Required or customary 
consultation; subnational 
authority to make or conduct its 
own policy in limited areas; 
separate representation in 
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A. More Defiant or Uncooperative 
1. Secession 
At the most extreme end of defiance and uncooperativeness lies 
a bundle of techniques associated with secession. Secession is, of 
course, a tactic that has the capacity to destroy the state entirely, or 
greatly to weaken it, whether through withdrawal of population 
and resources if successful, or through military conflict if unsuc-
cessful.96 History provides few instances of actual secession; among 
the federal states in the sample under consideration here, actual 
secession was accomplished only once, in the United States, and 
then only temporarily.97 However, a serious attempt at secession 
was made recently by the Spanish Autonomous Community of 
Catalonia, which in October 2017 issued a declaration of independ-
ence from Spain.98 This declaration prompted the Spanish govern-
ment to suspend Catalonia’s autonomy and assume direct control of 
its government.99 At this writing, the Catalan attempt to secede 
from Spain remains unsuccessful. 
A much more common, if less dire, tactic to which subnational 
units may resort is the threat of secession. Like the use of threats 
as a negotiating tactic in other situations,100 this tactic exploits 
96. See sources cited supra note 91. 
97. Outside the sample, instances of successful secession include the secession of Slovakia 
from Czechoslovakia, see Stephen Engelberg, Czechoslovakia Breaks in Two, to Wide Regret, 
N.Y.TIMES (Jan. 1, 1993), https://www. nytimes.com/1993/01/01/world/czechoslovakia-breaks-
in-two-to-wide-regret.html [https://perma.cc/A5JS-CJX4], the secession of several former 
Soviet Socialist Republics from the former Soviet Union following its collapse, see Francis X. 
Clines, Secession Decreed by Soviet Georgia, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 1991), https://www.nytimes. 
com/1991/04/10/world/secession-decreed-by-soviet-georgia.html [https://perma.cc/SF6T-
MH36], and perhaps the breakup of Yugoslavia, see Stephen Engelberg, Breakup of Yugoslav-
ia Leaves Slovenia Secure, Croatia Shaky, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 1992), https://www.nytimes. 
com/1992/01/16/world/breakup-of-yugoslavia-leaves-slovenia-secure-croatia-shaky.html 
[https://perma.cc/7P2G-U8FL]. 
98. Initially, the declaration was simultaneously declared and suspended, pending 
dialogue with the Spanish government. Raphael Minder & Patrick Kingsley, In Catalonia, A 
Declaration of Independence From Spain (Sort of), N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/10/10/world/europe/spain-catalonia-independence-carles-puigdemont.html 
[https://perma.cc/M6WS-4BED]. When dialogue did not ensue, the Catalan parliament, the 
Generalitat, affirmed the declaration. Minder & Kingsley, supra note 91. 
99. Minder & Kingsley, supra note 91. 
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legitimate and understandable fears of actual secession so as to 
extract—or perhaps, one might say, if the threat is sufficiently 
credible, to extort—benefits or concessions from the central state.101 
Among the states in my sample, this tactic has been most often and 
most successfully employed by the Canadian province of Quebec, 
which has twice held provincial referenda on the question of 
secession.102 Among other states in the sample, credible threats of 
secession have issued from the Spanish Autonomous Community of 
the Basque Country.103 
It is also useful to distinguish an additional variation: the tactic 
of talk of secession. Loose talk of secession is often heard in the 
United States in places such as Texas or, less frequently, in Cali-
fornia,104 and in Germany it is heard from time to time in Bavaria 
(sometimes referred to as the Texas or Quebec of Germany).105 Such 
talk often merely expresses frustration over persistent disagreement 
with the central state.106 Nevertheless, it can be significant, par-
ticularly when it is meant to signal to the central government an 
awareness of secession as a potential tool of resistance, along with 
a potential willingness to escalate mere mention of the tool to a 
more explicit threat if demands remain unmet.107 
create high levels of tension and pressure on the opponent.” GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL 
NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 49 (1983). When used effectively, such tactics can extract 
additional benefits for the party using them compared to more cooperative approaches, though 
it is imperative that they be used successfully; incompetent use of aggressive tactics can lead 
to worse outcomes. See id. at 49-50. 
101. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
102. See, e.g., KENNETH MCROBERTS, MISCONCEIVING CANADA:THE STRUGGLE FOR NATION-
AL UNITY 148-49 (1997); Alan C. Cairns, The Politics of Constitutional Renewal in Canada, 
in REDESIGNING THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 95, 112-13 (Keith G. 
Banting & Richard Simeon eds., 1985). 
103. For an account, see Gardner & Abadi Ninct, supra note 10, at 523-26. 
104. Lis Wiehl, Opinion: Secessionist Movements Not Far-Fetched in Today’s U.S., ATLANTA 
J.-CONST. (July 7, 2017, 3:00 PM), https://www.myajc.com/news/opinion/opinion-secessionist-
movements-not-far-fetched-today/S5oiQYG5oIMoPCU6yyScdI/ [https://perma.cc/4LVJ-BFUX]. 
105. Simon Shen, Is Bavaria Likely to Break Off From Germany?, EJINSIGHT (Aug. 3, 2017, 
11:25 AM), http://www.ejinsight.com/2017080-is-bavaria-likely-to-break-off-from-germany/ 
[https://perma.cc/YQ39-UZZH]; Interview with subject 27,Germanfederal government official 
(June 22, 2015); Interview with subject 30, German legal and political scholar (June 25, 2015). 
106. See Wiehl, supra note 104. 
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2. Violent Resistance 
Violent resistance by subnational units differs from secession in 
that force is invoked not to resist or obstruct all exercises of national 
power indiscriminately—the terms and conditions of federation 
itself are not denied—but rather to target narrowly some particular 
exercise of national power toward which the subnational unit feels 
extraordinary antipathy, and that presumably it has been unable to 
obstruct or mitigate by other, less drastic means. 
Contrary to Madison’s prediction,108 in the states under study 
there are no episodes of actual violence. I exclude here the extreme 
violence associated with the United States Civil War, which I have 
categorized as an act of secession, rather than merely an act of vio-
lent opposition to national policy. However, the United States and 
Argentina offer several instances in which violent resistance has 
been credibly threatened.109 The most dramatic example occurred in 
the United States during the Nullification Crisis of 1832.110 The 
state of South Carolina protested a national protectionist tariff by 
deploying armed forces to prevent collection of the federal tax in the 
port of Charleston.111 The United States responded by mobilizing 
for military intervention, but actual armed conflict was avoided 
when South Carolina forces stood down.112 In 1957, armed conflict 
over desegregation was narrowly avoided when Arkansas Governor 
Orval Faubus withdrew National Guard troops he had deployed 
to resist court-ordered desegregation of Central High School in 
Little Rock, the state capital.113 In 1988, Idaho Governor Cecil 
Andrus deployed state police to seize at the state border a railway 
shipment of radioactive waste generated at a federal nuclear facility 
108. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
109. See Kent Eaton, Menem and the Governors: Intergovernmental Relations in the 1990s, 
in ARGENTINE DEMOCRACY 88, 95 (Steven Levitsky & Maria Victoria Murillo eds., 2005) (dis-
cussing a threat made by a governor in Argentina to rebel against the federal government); 
FREEHLING, supra note 91 (discussing the pre-Civil War discontent in South Carolina re-
garding the federal government’s implementation of protective tariffs). 
110. FREEHLING, supra note 91, at 248, 250, 255, 263, 267, 275. 
111. Id. at 131, 262-63. 
112. Id. at 267, 290-91. 












    
 
 
534 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:507 
in Colorado.114 Andrus had the shipment seized pursuant to a state-
declared policy of refusing to accept additional nuclear waste from 
out of state.115 
In Argentina, an example of threatened violence occurred in the 
1980s. Carlos Menem, then governor of the province of La Rioja (and 
later elected President in 1989), sought to organize provincial 
resistance to a nationwide taxation policy that disadvantaged the 
provinces relative to the national government.116 In so doing, he 
called upon leaders of interior provinces to declare a state of rebel-
lion, cut energy supplies to the capital, and block provincial ports 
until taxing authority was returned to the subnational level.117 The 
threat was never made good because cooperation from other gov-
ernors was not forthcoming.118 
In most federations, resort to violence appears to be viewed as an 
inappropriate, and indeed a politically illegitimate method of resis-
tance to national power. This is the case, for example, in Austria,119 
and also in Spain, where subnational officials declined to urge vio-
lent resistance even in the face of Spanish revocation of Catalonia’s 
longstanding subnational autonomy.120 
3. Defiance 
Defiance, as I use the term here, is the nonviolent refusal of sub-
national governments to accept specific exercises of power by the 
central government. Defiance can take many forms, but it is useful 
to distinguish between strong and weak forms of defiance. 
114. See Fox Butterfield, Idaho Firm on Barring Atomic Waste, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 1988), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/23/us/idaho-firm-on-barring-atomic-waste.html [https:// 
perma.cc/85VA-SKHD]. 
115. See id. 
116. See Eaton, supra note 109, at 95. 
117. See id. 
118. See id. 
119. Interview with subject 16, Austrian legal scholar (Jan. 21, 2015). 
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a. Strong Defiance 
What I will call strong defiance consists of the open, nonviolent 
refusal by a subnational government to accede to some policy or 
action of the national government. A subnational government may 
defy national power by passive refusal to comply with disliked na-
tional policies, or by taking more elaborate, affirmative steps to 
undermine the operation or success of the national policy or action 
at issue within its borders.121 
The states under study furnish many examples of strong defiance. 
In the United States, southern states engaged in a lengthy period 
of open defiance of national enforcement of the political rights of 
African-Americans, including outright disregard of the Fifteenth 
Amendment,122 which prohibits states from denying the right to 
vote on account of race.123 Some U.S. states repeatedly defy nation-
al constitutional protection of the right to abortion by enacting 
highly restrictive laws.124 In Argentina during the 1990s, the gov-
ernment of Santa Cruz province refused repeatedly to comply with 
orders of the Argentine Supreme Court requiring reinstatement of 
a provincial Attorney General who had been removed from office 
after embarking on investigations into the activities of provincial 
government officials.125 In another incident, provincial courts in San 
121. See supra Table 1. 
122. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”). 
123. For example, decades after ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, states devised 
such exclusionary techniques as “grandfather clauses,” Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 
354, 356-57, 367-68 (1915) (voiding a grandfather clause adopted by Oklahoma), and white 
primaries, Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 462 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 651 
(1944). 
124. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) (discussing ban on “partial birth” 
abortions); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 750 (1986) 
(detailing regulation of abortion procedures); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 422 (1983) (requiring abortions to be performed in a hospital); Planned 
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 58 (1976) (requiring spousal consent 
requirement for abortion). 
125. See Antonio María Hernández, El incumplimiento de sentencias de la Corte Suprema 
de Justicia por la provincia de Santa Cruz y la posibilidad de la intervencion federal (2012), 
https://www.ancmyp.org/ar/user/FILES/05Hernández.pdf [https://perma.cc/T436-5LDL]; El 
procurador de Santa Cruz y el contrato secreto con Chevron, fallos de la Corte que aún no se 
cumplieron, LA NACION (Arg.) (Dec. 1, 2015, 7:43 AM), https://www.lanacion.com.ar/1850315-
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Luis province refused to enforce a national law regulating methods 
of determining the surnames of newborns.126 In 2017, the Catalan 
government defied a series of court orders designed to prevent a 
referendum on independence from Spain.127 
Subnational units engage from time to time in strong defiance 
even in states, such as Germany and Switzerland, that have a 
reputation for amicable intergovernmental relations,128 and in 
which, my interlocutors assured me, such tactics would never be 
used. For example, the German Land of Bavaria in 1983 enacted a 
law requiring the display of a crucifix in every public school class-
room.129 Upon challenge, the Constitutional Court ruled the law 
unconstitutional, but Bavaria has since refused to comply with the 
order.130 In Switzerland, the canton of Appenzell refused for nearly 
two decades to implement a 1971 national law mandating female 
suffrage until forced to do so by the federal courts.131 Similarly, the 
canton of Nidwalden has refused repeatedly to comply with a na-
tional law requiring cantons to share in the storage of nuclear 
waste.132 
b. Weak Defiance 
Weak defiance, as I use the term here, refers to actions intended 
to thwart, undermine, or diminish the force or success of national 
policies to which the subnational unit objects, but which do not rise 
fallos-corte-cristina [https://perma.cc/Z6TE-VPUE]. 
126. Interview with subject 44, Argentine political scholar (Aug. 10, 2015); Interview with 
subject 45, Argentine legal and political scholar (Aug. 10, 2015). 
127. See Raphael Minder, Spanish Court Moves to Pre-empt Catalan Independence 
Declaration, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/world/europe/ 
spain-catalonia-independence.html [https://perma.cc/32Q3-DYXM]. 
128. See infra notes 287-88 and accompanying text. 
129. See PALERMO & KÖSSLER, supra note 7, at 334. 
130. See id. 
131. See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Nov. 27, 1990, 116 ENTSCHEI-
DUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] IA 359 (Switz.). 
132. See PALERMO & KÖSSLER, supra note 7, at 390. Another example of defiance in a state 
that is routinely said to be characterized by punctilious observance of the law comes from 
Austria, where the governor of Carinthia refused to execute a federal law dealing with bi-
lingual road signs. See Peter Bussjäger, Intergovernmental Relations in Austria: Co-operative 
Federalism as Counterweight to Centralized Federalism, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
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to the level of open refusal. Use of the tactic exploits the margin of 
discretion afforded to subnational units in the implementation of 
national policies. The tactic can be invoked by cultivating a public 
appearance of compliance and cooperation with a disliked national 
policy, but then implementing or following it so half-heartedly, or 
even downright uncooperatively, as to undermine the policy’s force 
and effect within the jurisdiction.133 
A good example from the United States is Montana’s “compliance” 
with a 1975 national law establishing a national speed limit of 55 
miles per hour as part of an energy policy designed to conserve oil.134 
While most states responded with full compliance, including routine 
police enforcement, Montana complied in an extremely half-hearted 
way.135 Instead of enforcing violations of the 55-mile-per-hour speed 
limit as ordinary traffic infractions, it issued five-dollar “environ-
mental” citations to drivers traveling above 55 miles per hour, but 
below what Montana police considered an unsafe speed.136 Viola-
tions were not charged against drivers’ insurance records.137 This 
kind of “enforcement” signaled state opposition to the national 
policy, invited the public to disregard the national speed limit with 
near impunity within the borders of the state, and undermined the 
efficacy of the policy. Other examples from the United States 
include uncooperative implementation of national welfare laws and 
bending of national policy to state ends under the Clean Air Act.138 
Uncooperative implementation also occurs in Switzerland in 
circumstances where “the cantons use the federal policy as an 
instrument to promote their own, deviating objectives.”139 
133. For an account of such uncooperativeness in the United States, see generally Bulman-
Pozen & Gerken, supra note 10. 
134. See 23 U.S.C. § 154 (1976) (repealed 1995). 
135. See Tom Kenworthy, New Life in the Fast Lane: Wide-Open Throttles in Wide Open 
Spaces, WASH.POST (Dec. 9, 1995), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/12/ 
09/new-life-in-the-fast-lane-wid-open-throttles-in-wide-open-spaces/6e8be54f-a3ba-44b5-beb2-
aff0eb739ac2/noredirect=on&utm_term=.ec715f173c49 [https://perma.cc/2MGR-TFM9]. 
136. According to news accounts, the “conventional wisdom” was that no serious infractions 
would be charged for daytime driving below about 85 miles per hour in good weather 
conditions. See id. 
137. See id. 
138. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 10, at 1276-78. 
139. Wolf Linder & Adrian Vatter, Institutions and Outcomes of Swiss Federalism: The Role 
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Some federations, including Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, and Switzerland, adhere to a constitutional principle of 
“federal loyalty.”140 According to this principle, subnational units 
charged with implementing national law must discharge that 
obligation in good faith, and courts will review subnational actions 
for compliance with this requirement.141 Such a principle, where it 
exists, is typically understood to reduce the latitude otherwise 
available to subnational units to engage in weak defiance through 
uncooperative or bad-faith implementation of national measures.142 
Nevertheless, this principle does not entirely prevent subnational 
units from using even their limited discretion to undermine the ef-
ficacy of national policies with which they disagree. For example, a 
1999 German law designed to smooth the path to German citizen-
ship established standards for naturalization, including passage of 
a test.143 The Land of Baden-Württemberg exercised its discretion 
in designing the test to impose additional, tough procedural require-
ments that have greatly slowed the pace of naturalization in that 
jurisdiction, thus undermining to some extent the law’s intent.144 
4. Invocation of Third-Party Coercive Processes 
As Dicey and Wheare observed, another tactic of open conflict 
that may be available to subnational units in some federal states 
involves subnational invocation of the power of third-party institu-
tions to coerce the national government into pursuing policies more 
in accordance with subnational wishes.145 These third parties are 
generally of two types: national constitutional courts and suprana-
tional bodies.146 
Probably by far the most common form in which this tactic is 
invoked is through litigation in a national constitutional court. In 
all the federations under study except Switzerland, a so-called 
140. PALERMO & KÖSSLER, supra note 7, at 249-53; Erika Arban, Exploring the Principle 
of (Federal) Solidarity, 22 REV. CONST. STUD. 241, 242 (2017). 
141. See Arban, supra note 140, at 248-50. 
142. See id. 
143. See Palermo & Kössler, supra note 7, at 414. 
144. See id. at 414-15. 
145. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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“apex” court has the authority to review the validity of national laws 
and actions.147 In these circumstances, a subnational government 
opposed to some national law or policy has the opportunity to chal-
lenge that law or policy in court.148 Subnational litigation against 
national governments has achieved some significant successes in 
many federations—perhaps most.149 As in other cases, subnational 
units also generally have the less dramatic option of merely threat-
ening to go to court.150 Such threats are, naturally, even more com-
mon than actual litigation.151 
In addition, where federations are subject to the jurisdiction of 
supranational authorities, subnational units may also have the 
option of invoking coercive processes offered by those authorities. In 
Spain, for instance, the Basque Country has sued the Spanish State 
in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on two occasions 
in an attempt to reverse disliked policies of the Spanish govern-
ment. One suit sought to overturn a Spanish law that banned a 
Basque political party, and the other sought invalidation of a 
decision of the Spanish Constitutional Court holding that the 
Basque government lacked authority to put a referendum to Basque 
voters.152 In another instance of appeal to EU institutions, the 
Autonomous Communities of Madrid and Andalusia in 2007 ini-
tiated proceedings with the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Petitions to urge an investigation of coastal and urban development 
policies in Valencia.153 After a wide-ranging investigation, the Com-
mittee issued a report harshly critical of development policies ap-
plied in the region.154 
147. In Switzerland, the Federal Supreme Court has the authority to review the validity 
only of cantonal laws. See CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 
101, art. 189 (Switz.). 
148. See id. 
149. See Richard Simeon, Adaptability and Change in Federations, 53 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 
145, 148 (2002). 
150. See Dinan, supra note 10, at 405. 
151. See id.; Interview with subject 17, Austrian government official (Jan. 21, 2015). 
152. Batasuna v. Spain, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Etxeberria v. Spain, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2009). 
153. Report of the Committee on Petitions on the Fact-Finding Visit to Madrid, Valencia, 
Andalcia, at 6 (Mar. 28, 2007), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/ 
200801/20080131ATT20224/20080131ATT20224EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/53YH-W3S4]. 
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5. Withholding Cooperation Needed or Requested by the 
National Government 
A milder tactic, though one still lying toward the defiant end of 
the scale,155 consists of refusing to cooperate with the national gov-
ernment when requested to do so for purposes of effectuating some 
national policy. The tactic is available—and may be potent—where 
the constitution divides power among the levels of government in 
such a way that the national government lacks power unilaterally 
to adopt and implement some desired policy.156 In those circum-
stances, the policy can be adopted only through the cooperative ex-
ercise of power at both levels; subnational governments, in other 
words, hold a veto over the implementation of the policy.157 This 
tactic differs from weak defiance in that in those cases the national 
government has the constitutional authority to adopt and impose a 
policy, and subnational resistance can be mounted only through a 
kind of post hoc foot-dragging.158 
Withholding of cooperation is a common tactic in some federal 
states. To give a very recent example, an overwhelming majority of 
U.S. states refused a request by a newly established national com-
mission on voter fraud to turn over comprehensive information on 
voters held by state election officials.159 The commission had no in-
dependent source of access to this information, and was unable to 
perform its work without state cooperation.160 In Canada, the 
province of Quebec has refused on many occasions to work coopera-
tively with the national government to develop and implement 
nationwide programs which, on account of awkward constitutional 
allocations of authority, can be created only through national-prov-
incial coordination. For example, Quebec refused to join otherwise 
155. See supra Table 1. 
156. In the United States, for example, power is divided intricately between the state 
governments and national government, which is divided further between the branches. See 
supra notes 4-6, 85-86 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra notes 85-86, 89 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra Part II.A.3.b. 
159. See Mark Berman & John Wagner, Almost Every State Resists Trump’s Voter Fraud 
Commission, CHI. TRIB. (July 5, 2017, 6:22 PM) http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nation 
world/politics/ct-most-states-resist-voter-fraud-commission-20170705-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/ 7X4U-NQYW]. 
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comprehensive nationwide agreements on the provision of pensions 
and social welfare, and instead operates parallel programs of its 
own design.161 
B. More Neutral and Independent 
We turn now to a family of tactics lying toward the center of the 
spectrum bounded by defiance at one end and cooperation at the 
other.162 Here, the tactics of subnational influence are (1) invoked 
primarily where the national government has not acted, (2) not de-
ployed to oppose or to advance any national policy, and (3) involve 
the largely independent exercise of subnational power, either by 
individual subnational units or by some or all units acting in con-
cert. 
  1. Individual Exercise of Autonomous Power 
Perhaps the most direct way in which a subnational unit in a 
federal state can advance its own interests and policy preferences 
is simply by using its own independent powers to pursue them 
directly. In such cases, the subnational unit need not persuade the 
central state to act or refrain from acting, need not obtain its per-
mission, and need not negotiate with or consult it. Instead, 
subnational units can pursue their goals directly, through the use 
of powers allocated to them by the national constitution. For ex-
ample, in Canada, most law governing property, the family, con-
tract, and tort is provincial law.163 In the United States, the law of 
tort, contract, property, family relations, criminality, and even 
elections is made by states.164 In Belgium, the three subnational 
161. See MCROBERTS, supra note 102, at 41; Margot Young, The Social Union Framework 
Agreement: Hollowing Out the State, 10 CONST. F. 120, 120 (1999); Harvey Lazar, The Social 
Union Framework Agreement: Lost Opportunity or New Beginning? 1 (Sch. of Policy Studies, 
Working Paper No. 3, Aug. 2000). 
162. See supra Table 1. 
163. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3 (U.K), art. 92(13); 1 PETER W. HOGG, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 615-18 (2d ed. 1985). 
164. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Richard Y. Schauffler et al., Examining the Work of State 
Courts, CT. STAT. PROJECT (2012); supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text; see also infra 
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regions exercise exclusive power in the field of environmental policy, 
and use that authority regularly.165 
2. Subnational Cooperation and Harmonization 
In many circumstances, subnational units may wish to cooperate 
among themselves to develop and implement uniform policies for 
mutual benefit. If the national government takes no action, it is 
often possible for subnational units to advance their interests 
through mutual cooperation and collaboration undertaken in com-
plete independence from the central state. Where all subnational 
units participate, it is possible, through a process of policy harmon-
ization, for subnational units essentially to make national policy in 
the absence of national action.166 
Subnational cooperation and policy harmonization is common in 
federal states, and can take several different forms. At its most 
formal, such cooperation can utilize processes leading to the pro-
mulgation of a legally binding treaty or concordat among signatory 
subnational units. Authority to enter into such agreements is 
available in Austria, Argentina, Italy, and Switzerland.167 In the 
United States, states may enter into such compacts only with the 
approval of Congress.168 Subnational participation in these concor-
dats may in some cases be comprehensive, in which all units join, or 
it may be partial, in which fewer than all units join the agree-
ment.169 
At the other end of the scale are virtually ubiquitous processes by 
which subnational units cooperate and harmonize policy informally. 
165. Interview with subject 34, Belgian political scholar (June 29, 2015). It must be noted 
that this discretion is bounded by EU law, which contains extensive regulatory restrictions 
applicable in all member states. 
166. See Daniel Halberstam & Mathias Reimann, Federalism and Legal Unification: Com-
paring Methods, Results, and Explanations Across 20 Systems, in FEDERALISM AND LEGAL UNI-
FICATION: A COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF TWENTY SYSTEMS 3, 10-12 (Daniel 
Halberstam & Mathias Reimann eds., 2014). 
167. Art. 125, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.); BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESTZ 
[B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] as amended 2009, art. 15a (Austria); see Art. 117 Constituzione [Cost.] 
(It.); CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art. 48 (Switz.). 
168. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1. 
169. Interview with subject 8, Swiss legal and political scholar (Jan. 15, 2015); Interview 
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One of the most common forms of informal subnational cooperation 
is the practice of holding ministerial conferences, either on a nation-
wide or a regional basis. In Austria, for example, Länder governors 
meet several times a year in the Landeshauptmännerkonferenz 
(LHK) to pursue common interests and develop shared policies.170 
In Switzerland, a nationwide Conference des Cantons meets four to 
five times each year to coordinate policy projects, but there are also 
regional conferences of ministers, as well as regular single-issue 
conferences in which cantonal ministry officials for energy, health, 
or finance meet to coordinate cantonal action on issues of common 
interest.171 In Canada, such conferences are so frequent and occur 
at so many levels of governmental interaction that, by one count, 
government representatives of one province attended eighty-nine 
interprovincial meetings in a single year.172 
3. Reverse Preemption 
A somewhat more aggressive variation of the cooperative be-
havior just described is sometimes known as “reverse preemp-
tion.”173 In areas of concurrent jurisdiction between the two levels of 
government, lawmaking by the national government typically “pre-
empts”—displaces or invalidates—conflicting subnational laws, and 
in some cases regulatory activity at the national level can come so 
fully to occupy the field of activity as to preclude entirely any sub-
national role.174 Reverse preemption refers to the opposite phenome-
non, where subnational lawmaking occupies and squeezes out the 
national government from an area of concurrent jurisdiction.175 The 
170. Anna M. Gamper & Bernhard A. Koch, Federalism and Legal Unification in Austria, 
in FEDERALISM AND LEGAL UNIFICATION, supra note 166, at 103, 112. 
171. Interview with subject 6, Swiss subnational government official (Jan. 14, 2015). 
172. See John Warhurst, Managing Intergovernmental Relations, in FEDERALISM AND THE 
ROLE OF THE STATE 259, 263 (Herman Bakvis & William M. Chandler eds., 1987). 
173. See infra note 175. 
174. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012) (“Where Congress occupies 
an entire field ... even complementary state regulation is impermissible. Field pre-emption 
reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area.”). 
175. The term has previously been used in slightly different contexts. Compare Ann E. 
Carlson & Andrew Mayer, Reverse Preemption, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 583, 584 (2013), with Anita 
Bernstein, Implied Reverse Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 669, 673 (2009). Nugent refers to 
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mechanism, however, is different. Preemption in the formal legal 
sense occurs only in favor of national governments, but the direction 
of preemption can be reversed as a practical matter if subnational 
governments become first movers in a vacant policy space. In some 
circumstances, subnational units may act quickly enough to fill the 
policy space with policies that, either on account of their merit or 
simply because they grow familiar to a regulated populace, become 
as a matter of practical politics difficult for a national government 
to reverse or displace.176 It is a strategy, in other words, that exploits 
the power of first movers to set the policy agenda and the terms of 
debate. 
Knowing this, subnational units sometimes seek deliberately to 
achieve this entrenchment effect by coordinating their activities, 
cooperatively harmonizing policy preferences, and implementing 
those preferences by law before the national government takes ac-
tion. In the United States, for example, state-by-state adoption of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, developed by the American Law 
Institute, a private law reform organization, created nationwide 
consistency in commercial law,177 obviating the need for federal 
intervention to create uniformity in an important area of interstate 
commerce.178 In Switzerland, the cantons are presently attempting 
to harmonize educational policies on school start dates, graduation 
requirements, and programs of study, including language instruc-
tion policies, so as to fend off national uniform legislation.179 In 
Austria, harmonization of policy initiatives concerning uses of public 
funds by Land governors succeeded in inducing the national 
government to drop plans for a uniform national law.180 
176. The advantage of the first mover is thus related to well-known principles of path 
dependency and policy diffusion. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Autonomy and Isomorphism: 
The Unfulfilled Promise of Structural Autonomy in American State Constitutions, 60 WAYNE 
L. REV. 31, 51-66 (2014) (explaining the process in the context of public policy and consti-
tutional law); Dennis C. Mueller, First-Mover Advantages and Path Dependence, 15 INT’L J. 
INDUS. ORG. 827, 843-46 (1997) (explaining the process in the context of market competition). 
177. See Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Research Guide, DUKE U. SCH. L. 1 (Dec. 2016), 
https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/lib/ucc.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XMY-EA5W]. 
178. For an analysis of how the courts also often create uniform law apart from the federal 
government, see Halberstam & Reimann, supra note 166, at 12-13. 
179. Interview with subject 13, Swiss government official (Jan. 16, 2015); Interview with 
subject 7, Swiss legal and political scholar (Jan. 14, 2015). 
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Reverse preemption differs from the harmonized development of 
subnational policies mainly in its scale. Horizontal harmonization 
may occur in policy fields where there is some national activity, 
where subnational units are content to share the policy space, or 
where fewer than all subnational units can agree on substantive 
policy. Reverse preemption is designed to exclude the national gov-
ernment entirely from a policy space by joint enactment of a 
uniform policy of broad scope. 
4. Power Entrepreneurialism 
An even more aggressive tactic consists of the deliberate attempt 
by a subnational unit to expand unilaterally the scope of its powers 
by simply exercising power that it does not have, or in conditions of 
constitutional uncertainty as to whether or not the power exists. 
The motivation for this strategy is the hope that use of a contested 
power will result eventually in recognition of the legitimacy of the 
subnational claim to possession of the power. By using the power, 
especially without objection by the national government, the subna-
tional unit in essence manufactures evidence that the power legit-
imately belongs to it. 
A good example of this tactic is Quebec’s deliberate strategy to 
gain a greater role in Canadian foreign policy. In 1965, Quebec 
claimed, on the basis of the Canadian Constitution’s requirement 
of provincial cooperation in treaty implementation, that provinces 
could have their own foreign policies, and it took the first step in 
this direction by signing an educational agreement with France.181 
Federal officials quickly “rejected Québec’s claims for diplomatic in-
dependence on the grounds that national sovereignty is indivis[i]-
ble in international law.”182 Nevertheless, the national government 
at the same time invited the provinces to take a more active role in 
formulating foreign policy in areas related to their constitutional 
authority.183 Despite some missteps,184 Quebec’s entrepreneurialism 
181. Stephen Clarkson, Vive le Québec Libre! or Putting the Leader Back In, in FEDERALISM 
AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DONALD SMILEY 55, 60 (David P. 
Shugarman & Reg Whitaker eds., 1989). 
182. Id. at 63. 
183. Gregory S. Mahler, Québec and Foreign Policy: Overseas Options for a Province in a 










   
    
546 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:507 
eventually yielded a settlement in which foreign policy in some ar-
eas was thereafter conducted on a cooperative basis,185 and the fed-
eral government agreed to permit Quebec to become directly and 
officially involved on its own account in some international organi-
zations.186 
C. More Cooperative and Integrated 
This Part surveys subnational tactics for influencing national 
policy that proceed from a stance of cooperation and partnership. 
Conflict, to be sure, may nonetheless arise even in the pursuit of 
these tactics, but resort to these tools suggests a belief at the subna-
tional level, and perhaps at the national level as well, that conflicts 
may be resolved through cooperative means such as discussion, 
persuasion, and negotiation, even in circumstances where bargain-
ing power between the levels of government may be unequal. 
1. Negotiation and Bargaining 
Negotiation of many kinds occurs frequently in federal states, and 
in some states is a strongly preferred method of conducting inter-
governmental relations.187 The category of national-subnational “ne-
gotiation,” however, is extremely broad. Many factors relevant to the 
process can vary in proceedings that are all properly described as 
“negotiation.” For example, negotiations may be recurring or ad hoc, 
involving repeat or one-time players. They may occur in formal, 
high-visibility settings where the stakes are high and outcomes 
have binding legal force, or they may take place in informal settings, 
without public knowledge or observation, where the stakes are low 
and little turns on the success or failure of any particular encounter. 
The bargaining power of the parties may range considerably from 
areas, specifically using the example of education, invites direct agreement between 
individual provinces and foreign governments). 
184. See id. (noting conflict with Ottowa regarding Québec’s involvement in independent 
international relations). 
185. Clarkson, supra note 181, at 66-67. 
186. Mahler, supra note 183, at 68. 
187. This is notably true, for example, in Canada. See RICHARD SIMEON, FEDERAL-PROV-
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context to context, often depending on constitutional endowments 
of authority, which typically differ from subject to subject.188 Nego-
tiations may be bilateral or multilateral, potentially altering the 
dynamics. 
Notwithstanding this variation, it is possible to identify two broad 
tactics that subnational units pursue in negotiations with their 
national governments: demands for policies and demands for power. 
In the first instance, subnational units attempt to influence the con-
tent of policies pursued by the national government.189 In the sec-
ond, subnational units aim for a bigger prize, one that, if they are 
successful, will make future bargaining with the national govern-
ment on the same topic unnecessary, as authority to make policy in 
the area in question will in the future belong directly to the sub-
national unit.190 
Although negotiation as a tactic presupposes a baseline level of 
cooperation and good relations, negotiations can nevertheless be 
conducted in contexts in which relations lie across a spectrum from 
conflictual to harmonious. The sections below describe several com-
monly recurring negotiating situations arrayed from most conflict-
ual to most harmonious. 
a. Demands for More Power or Autonomy 
We tend to think of federal constitutions as allocating power 
among the levels of government with finality. That is not always the 
case, however; some federal constitutions instead define a range of 
allocations of power and create processes that can be invoked to 
alter allocations within the permitted range.191 Typically, the na-
tional government plays an important role in processes that might 
alter the initial constitutional balance of power by expanding the 
powers of subnational units. 
In these circumstances, an opening exists for subnational govern-
ments to approach the national government not to demand that the 
188. For a discussion of varying constitutional grants of authority, see infra notes 212-15 
and accompanying text. 
189. See infra Part II.C.1.c. 
190. See infra Part II.C.1.c. 
191. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 39, 41-44, 46, 51-52, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain); Arts. 
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central state pursue any particular policy, but rather to demand 
that it invoke constitutional processes to expand the autonomous 
power of the subnational unit.192 Although such negotiations may be 
conducted amicably, I characterize them as proceeding from a 
position of relative conflict because a subnational demand to expand 
its authority seems most likely to rest upon some antecedent dis-
satisfaction with either limits on its role in the federation, or with 
the performance of the national state in the policy field that the 
subnational unit seeks authority to enter on its own account. 
Perhaps the preeminent example of such a process occurs in 
Spain. Under the Spanish Constitution, subnational units called 
Autonomous Communities may seek recognition from the central 
government, and along with recognition, approval of what amounts 
to a subnational constitution known as a Statute of Autonomy.193 
The Statute of Autonomy may attribute to the Autonomous Com-
munity any of a set of subnational powers listed in the Spanish 
Constitution as available for devolution.194 Thus, in Spain, subna-
tional units may gain a greater measure of autonomy and self-
governance simply by directly asking for it.195 
In principle, the Spanish Constitution holds out to the Autono-
mies the possibility of assuming a fair amount of power.196 Granting 
such requests lies, however, within the unilateral discretion of the 
Cortes Generales, the Spanish national parliament, and it therefore 
need not grant Autonomous Communities all or even any of the 
autonomous powers they seek.197 Parliament has in most cases ex-
ercised its discretion beneficently,198 but of course that willingness 
is voluntary and not legally required.199 Recently, Spain for the first 
192. See infra notes 193-203 and accompanying text. 
193. C.E., B.O.E. n. 145-47, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). 
194. Id. at n. 148-50. 
195. Gardner & Abad I Ninet, supra note 10, at 507. 
196. See C.E., B.O.E. n. 148-50, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). 
197. See id. at n. 150. 
198. Gardner & Abad I Ninet, supra note 10, at 507. 
199. In the past, some have disagreed, arguing that such powers cannot be revoked as a 
matter of practical politics, making the devolution tantamount to irreversible. See, e.g., 
Hueglin, supra note 9, at 39; Carles Viver, Spain’s Constitution and Statutes of Autonomy: 
Explaining the Evolution of Political Decentralization, in  CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS IN 
FEDERAL SYSTEMS: SUB-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 218, 224 (Michael Burgess & G. Alan Tarr 
eds., 2012). Recent events in Spain seem to provide conclusive evidence against this 
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time reversed a decision concerning subnational autonomy by re-
voking Catalonia’s status as an autonomous subnational unit of 
the state.200 
Requests for additional autonomy are also made from time to 
time in Italy. There, bilateral regional commissions have been es-
tablished to create avenues of communication between the central 
government and each of the five “special” regions of Italy that, in an 
asymmetric feature of the national constitution, possess a height-
ened level of autonomy.201 At the request of these special regions, 
the bilateral commissions have from time to time recommended to 
the central government that additional powers and autonomy be 
devolved to a region so requesting.202 These recommendations are 
typically followed,203 resulting in the accumulation by subnational 
units of additional competencies. 
Not every bargain involves exchanging goods of the same kind. In 
one form of asymmetrical dealmaking, subnational units in federal 
states exploit their ability to influence political competition within 
the jurisdiction so as to extract favorable policy concessions from 
elected national officials whose political fortunes may be influenced 
by subnational action. 
This dynamic is commonplace in the United States. A quirk of the 
U.S. constitutional structure allocates to states the authority to 
regulate not only state elections but federal ones as well.204 A state’s 
ability to exercise these powers—particularly the power to draw fed-
eral election districts— in ways detrimental to incumbent federal 
legislators, requires members of Congress to maintain cordial rela-
tions with state officials, and of course one way to do so is to be 
attentive to and supportive of state policy preferences in Con-
200. See supra note 98. 
201. Art. 116 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
202. Jens Woelk, What It Means to be Special in Relations with the Central State: Insti-
tutions and Procedures, in TOLERANCE THROUGH LAW: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND GROUP RIGHTS 
IN SOUTH TYROL 121, 121-42 (Jens Woelk et al. eds., 2008). 
203. Id.; Interview with subject 19, Italian legal and political scholar (Feb. 10, 2015), 
Interview with subject 20, Italian political scholar (Feb. 10, 2015). 
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gress.205 These kinds of transactions are also common and deeply 
entrenched in Argentina. There, candidates for the national leg-
islature are selected by local party bosses, and it is typically the 
provincial governor who dominates the local party apparatus.206 
Governors thus exercise significant agency in who runs for nation-
al office, including whether incumbents stand for reelection and 
what resources are placed at their disposal.207 In addition, the prov-
incial legislature determines the date of national elections, affording 
in many cases significant influence over the outcomes.208 In these 
circumstances, national legislators must in general attend closely 
to the wishes of provincial governors. 
In its most extreme form, the exchange of political favors for pol-
icy concessions can rise to the level of clientelism, a condition said, 
among the states studied here, to characterize intergovernmental 
relations in Argentina. The budgets of most Argentine provinces are 
205. Congressional redistricting is said to be “the one time when the members of Congress 
must come ‘hat in hand’ to ask the state legislature for favors.” Kirsten Nussbaumer, The 
Election Law Connection and U.S. Federalism, 43 PUBLIUS 392, 399 (2013) (quoting Texas 
election lawyer Steve Bickerstaff). The historical record is replete with examples of aspiring 
or incumbent members of Congress who have failed to heed this rule and subsequently found 
themselves drawn out of safe districts and into treacherous ones. In the very first con-
gressional election, in 1788, Patrick Henry, Virginia’s leading Antifederalist and Governor 
from 1784 to 1786, is reputed to have engineered a districting plan that placed James 
Madison into a heavily Antifederalist district, though the most thorough study of this incident 
casts doubt on the veracity of the inherited story. See  ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 31-41 (1907). More recently, figures ranging from 
William McKinley, to Abner Mikva, to Barack Obama have been deliberately gerrymandered 
into tough districts when they failed to please state officials in charge of the districting 
process. See KARL ROVE, THE TRIUMPH OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY 54, 63, 80 (2015); Abner J. 
Mikva, Justice Brennan and the Political Process: Assessing the Legacy of Baker v. Carr, 1995 
U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 691; Ryan Lizza, Making It: How Chicago Shaped Obama, NEW YORKER 
(July 21, 2008), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/07/21/making-it [https://perma. 
cc/35ZC-K922]. Mikva reports that he himself was gerrymandered out of a safe seat because 
he was “a very discrete and insular minority—a non-Daley Democrat in Chicago.” Mikva, 
supra, at 691; see also Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of 
Federalism, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 859, 893 (arguing that state control over redistricting 
“incentivizes its congressional delegation to consider the states’ interests when the delegation 
votes on federal policy”). 
206. Mark P. Jones & Wonjae Hwang, Provincial Party Bosses: Keystone of the Argentine 
Congress, in ARGENTINE DEMOCRACY supra note 109, at 115, 123, 125. 
207. See Marcelo Leiras, Las contradicciones aparentes del federalismo argentino y sus 
consecuencias políticas y socialies, in ¿CUÁNTO IMPORTAN LAS INTITUCIONES? GOBIERNO, 
ESTADO Y ACTORES EN LA POLÍTICA ARGENTINA 209 209 (Carlos H. Acuña ed., 2013). 
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heavily dependent on fiscal transfers from the central govern-
ment.209 At the same time, provincial governors often maintain their 
own power by distributing material goods and patronage to their 
constituents.210 This results in a dynamic where governors extract 
fiscal concessions from the central government in exchange for 
providing political and electoral support to members of the incum-
bent or dominant party, in turn putting governors in a position to 
shore up their own popularity at home by distributing to voters the 
resources thus extracted.211 
c. The Partnership Model 
In this very common context, which most closely approximates 
the ideal model of intergovernmental negotiations, national and 
subnational officials sit down together in good faith and a spirit of 
cooperation to negotiate over the substance of collective policy. 
At their most complex, intergovernmental negotiations may take 
the form of comprehensive multilateral negotiation, in which all 
subnational units and the national government negotiate together 
over policies of nationwide scope. In Canada, these types of pro-
ceedings occur frequently.212 On some occasions, all fourteen heads 
of state (the Prime Minister and the Premiers of all ten provinces 
and all three territories) meet together.213 This most typically oc-
curs within the formal confines of the institutionalized and routin-
ized First Ministers Conference (FMC), but also on a more ad hoc 
basis in the form of First Ministers Meetings called to deal with 
occasional crises, or, from time to time, in quiet, behind-the-scenes 
209. Carlos Gervasoni, A Rentier Theory of Subnational Regimes: Fiscal Federalism, 
Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Argentine Provinces, 62 WORLD POL. 302, 311 (2010). 
210. Jones & Hwang, supra note 206, at 123-25; Iván Llamazares, Patterns in Contin-
gencies: The Interlocking of Formal and Informal Political Institutions in Contemporary 
Argentina, 83 SOC. FORCES 1671, 1675 (2005). 
211. Ardanaz et al., supra note 10, at 29. According to González, “districts loyal to the 
president receive on average almost 60 percent more infrastructure funds than the op-
position.” Lucas González, Presidential Popularity and the Politics of Distributing Federal 
Funds in Argentina, 46 PUBLIUS 199, 201 (2016). 
212. Martin Papillon & Richard Simeon, The Weakest Link? First Ministers’ Conferences 
in Canadian Intergovernmental Relations, in CANADA: THE STATE OF THE FEDERATION, 2002 
113, 118-21 (J. Peter Meekison et al. eds., 2004). 
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meetings out of the public eye.214 Not all such negotiations involve 
the Prime Minister and Premiers directly; many Canadian intergov-
ernmental negotiations are handled by ministers or bureaucrats 
with specific portfolios acting as representatives of their govern-
ments.215 
Comprehensive intergovernmental negotiations have produced 
some of the most significant and transformative policy programs in 
Canadian history. One such program is the Agreement on Internal 
Trade (AIT), a deal struck between the federal and provincial gov-
ernments in 1994 that prohibits the erection of internal trade bar-
riers, guarantees nondiscrimination in economic opportunities on 
the basis of origin or residency, and commits all governments to the 
liberalization of trade.216 Another is the Social Union Framework 
Agreement (SUFA), a deal struck in 1999 that established a col-
laborative framework among the federal government and all of the 
provinces (except Quebec, which did not join the agreement) to 
develop and structure social programs on a basis of equality, respect 
for human rights, and geographical uniformity of access to social 
programs and services.217 In addition, SUFA committed the gov-
ernments to the elimination of barriers to mobility arising from res-
idency requirements for social programs, and various other mea-
218sures. 
Negotiations also can be conducted on a bilateral basis, in which 
the national government negotiates with a single subnational unit, 
or in some cases with more than one but less than all. Like multilat-
eral negotiations, bilateral negotiations also can be conducted on a 
214. See id. 
215. Simeon’s analogy to international diplomacy, see SIMEON, supra note 187, at 66-68, 
228-33, has great traction here: just as in the international realm, Canadian intergovern-
mental relations may be carried on by heads of state, or by progressively lower-level officials, 
depending upon the degree of interest and involvement governments wish to convey, con-
sistent with diplomatic conventions. 
216. See generally Agreement on Internal Trade, pmbl., July 1, 1995, https://www.ic.gc.ca/ 
eic/site/ait-aci.nsf/eng/h_il00034.html [https://perma.cc/9CQT-LFZ5] [hereinafter Agreement 
on Internal Trade]. These negotiations are described in depth in G. BRUCE DOERN & MARK 
MACDONALD, FREE-TRADE FEDERALISM: NEGOTIATING THE CANADIAN AGREEMENT ON IN-
TERNAL TRADE (1999). 
217. See A Framework to Improve the Social Union for Canadians, Feb. 4, 1999, http:// 
www.scics.ca/en/product-produit/agreement-to-improve-the-social-union-for-canadians/ 
[https://perma.cc/ 6T4J-2JU8]. See generally Young, supra note 161; Lazar, supra note 161. 
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formal or informal basis. On the more formal side, for example, 
Article 15a of the Austrian Constitution authorizes “[t]he Feder-
ation and the Länder [to] conclude agreements among themselves 
about matters within their respective sphere of competence.”219 Less 
formally, in Italy, the Standing Conference of the State and Region 
is a consultative council of national and regional ministers that 
advises the national government about matters of regional con-
cern.220 In Canada, the national government will sometimes cut side 
deals with individual provinces to secure their agreement to a 
broader programmatic framework.221 For example, in order to induce 
agreement to the AIT by British Columbia, Alberta, Quebec, and 
Newfoundland, the national government agreed during negotiations 
to provisions creating narrow (and frankly protectionist) exclusions 
for British Columbia and Alberta’s export of logs, Quebec’s export 
approval measures relating to unprocessed fish, and Newfound-
land’s requirement for in-province fish processing.222 In Germany, 
it is so common for the national government to offer beneficial side 
deals to induce recalcitrant Länder to support national programs 
that a term has developed to describe it: “going shopping” in the 
Bundesrat.223 
For the most part, subnational units engage in negotiation with 
national governments because they hope to influence national poli-
cy making in directions of their liking.224 However, intergovernmen-
tal negotiations may on occasion have a different aim: to alter the 
constitutional framework itself.225 In Austria, for example, the con-
stitution can be altered by a two-thirds vote of parliament, without 
any requirement of subsequent popular ratification.226 On many 
219. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION], BGBL No. 127/2009 as 
amended BGBL I No. 164/2013, art. 15 ¶ 1 (Austria). 
220. Woelk, supra note 202, at ¶ 1, 126-27. 
221. See, e.g., Agreement on Internal Trade, supra note 216, at annex 1102.3. 
222. See id. 
223. Interview with subject 28, German legal and political scholar (June 24, 2015); In-
terview with subject 29, German legal and political scholar (June 24, 2015). 
224. See supra Part II.C.1. 
225. See supra Parts II.C.1, II.C.1.a. 
226. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] 1920 BGBL No. 127/2009, as 
amended BGBL I No. 164/2013, art. 44, ¶ 1 (Austria). Popular ratification is required only for 
a “total revision.” See id. art. 44, ¶ 3. However, if one-third of the members of either chamber 
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occasions, Austrian officials at the national and subnational levels 
have reached agreements leading to changes in the allocation of 
power between the two levels.227 Interestingly, most of these alter-
ations—about one hundred—have resulted in transfers of power to 
the national level,228 although some pushback by the Länder has on 
occasion produced enhancements to subnational power.229 
In Canada, the practice of “executive federalism” is capable of 
producing changes to the constitutional allocation of power through 
much less formal means. Executive federalism230 is a process of poli-
cy making in which major decisions about national policy are made 
not in the deliberations of a broadly representative national legis-
lature, but through intergovernmental negotiations among the chief 
executives of the national and subnational governments.231 Because 
the Canadian constitutional amending formula does not require 
popular participation,232 Canadian intergovernmental negotiations 
can extend not merely to policy within the constitutional framework, 
but to the terms of the basic constitutional framework itself: “[f]ed-
eral-provincial relations are often attempts to get around con-
stitutional strictures, and in doing so they may result in de facto 
constitutional changes.”233 
227. See Anna Gamper, The Austrian Constitutional Convention: Continuing the Path to 
Reform the Federal State?, 2 REVISTA D’ESTUDIS AUTONÒMICS I FEDERALS 9, 15-18 (2006) 
(Spain). 
228. Interview with subject 14, Austrian legal and political scholar (Jan. 20, 2015); In-
terview with subject 15, Austrian legal and political scholar (Jan. 20, 2015). 
229. See Peter Bussjäger, Between Europeanization, Unitarism and Autonomy: Remarks 
on the Current Situation of Federalism in Austria, 10 REVISTA D’ESTUDIS AUTONÒMICS I 
FEDERALS 11, 19-21 (2010) (Spain); Gamper, supra note 227, at 12-14.
230. The term is credited to Donald V. Smiley. See generally  DONALD V. SMILEY, THE 
FEDERAL CONDITION IN CANADA 83-84 (1987). 
231. As one commentator has put it, “[i]n Canada, intergovernmental relations have be-
come the substitute for engagement through Parliament.” DAVID E. SMITH, FEDERALISM AND 
THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA 93 (2010); see also PETER H. RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ODYS-
SEY: CAN CANADIANS BECOME A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? 81 (3d ed. 2004) (“By the mid 1960s 
meetings of federal and provincial ministers and their expert advisers on virtually all topics 
became so numerous that they were supplanting legislatures as the primary arena of Ca-
nadian policy making.”). 
232. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3 (U.K.), art. 38 §§ 1-2. 
233. SIMEON, supra note 187, at 41. Gibbins takes a somewhat different view of the same 
phenomenon: “[I]t is important to note the capacity of intergovernmental relations to rewrite 
the federal script in Canada without the necessity of constitutional change.” Roger Gibbins, 
Constitutional Politics, in CANADIAN POLITICS 97, 112 (James Bickerton & Alain-G. Gagnon 
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At the limit, Canadian provincial initiatives, especially at the in-
sistence of Quebec, have precipitated rounds of metaconstitutional 
politics, in which the Prime Minister and Premiers have agreed to 
rewrite the Canadian Constitution in comprehensive and far-
reaching ways.234 In 1987, an agreement—the Meech Lake Ac-
cord—was concluded in principle.235 That agreement would, among 
other things, have recognized Quebec as a “distinct society,” given 
it a greater and asymmetrical role in immigration, provided each 
province with the power to veto constitutional amendments, and 
placed limits on the federal spending power.236 After an agreement 
had been reached but before it could be implemented, unexpected 
changes in political leadership in Newfoundland and Manitoba 
eliminated the unanimity necessary to formalize the agreed con-
stitutional amendments.237 A similar process of metaconstitutional 
negotiation was completed in 1992, this time with the sustained 
unanimous support of provincial leaders, resulting in the Charlotte-
town Accord.238 In an unusual move, however, the Accord provided 
for popular participation in the form of a national referendum, 
sending the outcome of intergovernmental constitutional negotia-
tions to a rare, narrow defeat.239 
2. Influence in National Domestic Policy-Making Processes 
Another avenue of subnational influence is available when subna-
tional units have opportunities to be heard within the processes by 
which the national government makes internal decisions on matters 
of substantive policy.240 In these instances, subnational interests 
and preferences are presented to the national government not in the 
234. See HOGG, supra note 163, at 70-71. 
235. See Jeffrey J. Cole, Canadian Discord over the Charlottetown Accord: The 
Constitutional War to Win Quebec, 11 DICK. J. INT’L L. 627, 634, 639-43 (1993). 
236. HOGG, supra note 163, at 70-73; see also Cole, supra note 235, at 639-42. 
237. See Cole, supra note 235, at 642 n.125. 
238. See id. at 642-43. For a thorough, contemporaneous postmortem of the Meech Lake 
Accord, see generally K.E. SWINTON & C. J. ROGERSON, COMPETING CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS: 
THE MEECH LAKE ACCORD (1988). 
239. For an account of the defeat of the Charlottetown referendum, see, for example, 
Michael Lusztig, Constitutional Paralysis: Why Canadian Constitutional Initiatives Are 
Doomed to Fail, 27 CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 747, 761-70 (1994). 
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context of external demands, to which the national government may 
or may not attend, but internally, as considerations integrated into 
the national decision making process at its source.241 
a. Direct Subnational Participation in National Lawmaking 
Subnational influence within the national government takes 
many forms. One of the strongest is direct or formal subnational 
participation in the processes of federal lawmaking. In some cases, 
for example, subnational agreement is required for certain national 
laws to take effect. In Argentina, federal enactment of a fiscal 
revenue-sharing law requires approval of all the provinces.242 In 
Switzerland, cantons have the authority to introduce measures 
directly into the federal parliament,243 which they do between ten 
and twenty times each year.244 In Austria, Länder may exercise a 
suspensive veto over procurement measures of the federal govern-
ment that touch upon subnational competencies.245 
Another mechanism capable of integrating subnational units 
more directly into national lawmaking processes is the availability 
of instruments of direct democracy at the national level.246 For ex-
ample, Swiss cantons have the authority under the Swiss Con-
stitution to force a national referendum on national laws.247 This has 
proven to be a potent tool of subnational influence, to the point 
where the constant threat of a referendum has caused the Swiss na-
tional legislature to exercise considerable self-restraint in legisla-
tion; essentially, the parliament has developed a habit of securing 
241. See infra Part II.C.2.a. 
242. Art. 2, § 75, cl.2, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.). This requirement, 
along with certain structural pathologies relating to provincial incentives, have precluded 
enactment of such a law since this provision was inserted into the constitution in 1994. See 
Alfredo M. Vitolo, The Argentine Federal Legislative System, in  FEDERALISM AND LEGAL 
UNIFICATION, supra note 166, at 71, 80-81; Interview with subject 42, Argentine legal scholar 
(Aug. 9, 2015). 
243. CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art. 160, para. 
1 (Switz). 
244. Interview with subject 8, Swiss scholar and political scholar (Jan. 15, 2015). 
245. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBL No. 127/2009, as 
amended BGBL I No. 164/2013, arts. 14b, 42a (Austria). 
246. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art. 
141 (Switz.). 
247. See id. 
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cantonal agreement in advance of enacting legislation so as to de-
fuse the possibility of a subsequent referendum challenge.248 
b. Indirect or Informal Influence in National Legislatures 
Subnational influence in national legislative processes can also be 
indirect.249 
i. Through a Second Chamber 
As Herbert Wechsler observed in his influential 1954 article,250 
one of the most common avenues for this kind of influence is 
through a senate or second chamber.251 In some ways, this is the 
prototypical avenue for subnational influence in federations, and it 
is considered by some theorists to be one of the defining features of 
a true federation.252 I have categorized this form of subnational 
influence as indirect because second chambers in modern federal 
states do not provide representation in the national legislature to 
subnational units directly in their capacity as autonomous govern-
ments. In no case, for example, is the action of a senator or a senate 
delegation considered to be an official action of a subnational gov-
ernment.253 Rather, the actions of senators are considered to be 
actions of national officials who have connections—in some cases, to 
be sure, very strong connections—to subnational governments.254 
248. Interview with subject 6, Swiss subnational government official (Jan. 14, 2015); 
Interview with subject 8, Swiss legal and political scholar (Jan. 15, 2015). 
249. See infra Part II.C.2.b.(i)-(iv). 
250. Wechsler, supra note 43. 
251. See id. at 546-52. 
252. See  DAVIS, supra note 9, at 142; INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, PARLIAMENTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS 
IN FORTY-ONE COUNTRIES 3-4 (1962); WATTS, supra note 7, at 8-9. Typically for the field, alas, 
this assertion is emphatically denied by others. See, e.g., KING, supra note 18, at 94-95. 
Duchacek notes that bicameralism is “intimately associated with federalism,” but in the end 
lists it only as one of ten “yardsticks” of federalism, suggesting that it is not essential. 
DUCHACEK, supra note 9, at 207-08, 244-52. 
253. Historically, that kind of relationship would be more typical of a confederation, in 
which the representatives are merely emissaries of a different government which they 
primarily serve. Cf.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 art. V (state delegations cast a 
single vote as a unit, presumably representing the positions of their governments as am-
bassadors do). 
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Their actions may thus reflect the influence of subnational govern-
ments, but they are not the actions of those governments.255 
The degree of influence that subnational governments exercise 
over federal senators can vary significantly. The strongest kind of 
influence undoubtedly is exercised when the subnational govern-
ment has the authority unilaterally to appoint senators.256 In the 
present sample, this is the case in Germany and Austria, in which 
Länder governments directly appoint members of the Bundesrat.257 
Influence, however, can also be exercised through less formal 
means. Subnational officials may be able to exercise informal influ-
ence on national senators through personal connections, by exploit-
ing senators’ sense of subnational loyalty, or through influence they 
may be able to exert in the processes of senatorial elections within 
the subnational unit.258 
The degree of subnational influence that may be exercised within 
the national legislature via influence over members of the second 
chamber will also vary with the degree of formal power possessed by 
that chamber in the processes of national lawmaking.259 A senate 
that possesses the authority to veto outright national legislation 
proposed by the lower house offers the greatest prospect for indirect 
subnational influence. This is the case in the United States, for 
example, where agreement of the U.S. Senate is needed for every 
piece of federal legislation,260 and it is also the case in Germany for 
certain categories of legislation that strongly affect the interests of 
and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case, 6 J. POL. LATIN 
AM. 73, 73-78 (2014). 
255. See id. 
256. See, e.g., BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBL No. 127/2009 
as amended BGBL I No. 164/2013, art. 35 (Austria). 
257. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG][CONSTITUTION] BGBL No.127/2009 as amended 
BGBL I No. 164/2013, art. 35 (Austria); GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 51 § 1, (Ger.), 
translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0249 
[https://perma.cc/Q8T8-92P2]. 
258. See Kikuchi & Lodola, supra note 254, at 75-78. Regarding subnational influence on 
the election of national legislators in the United States and Argentina, see id.; supra Part 
II.C.1.b. This appears to be relatively common in federal states. See Kikuchi & Lodola, supra 
note 254, at 75-78. For discussion of this dynamic in a state outside this study, see Joy 
Langston, Governors and “Their” Deputies: New Legislative Principals in Mexico, 35 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q. 235 (2010); Guillermo Rosas & Joy Langston, Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting 
Behavior of National Legislators, 73 J. POL. 477 (2011). 
259. See Rosas & Langston, supra note 258, at 479-82. 
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the Länder.261 A national senate that exercises only a suspensive 
veto, as in Austria,262 will inject less subnational influence into na-
tional policy-making decisions regardless of how strongly subna-
tional officials may be able to influence the senators (and in Austria, 
that influence is quite weak).263 
A Senate also will serve as a stronger or weaker vector of sub-
national influence depending upon the extent of negotiations and 
logrolling that by law or by custom occurs between the two cham-
bers.264 For example, even though approval of the German Bundes-
rat is not required for many kinds of legislation, a strong and 
longstanding custom of interchamber negotiations projects the 
power of the Bundesrat—and by implication the influence of the 
Länder—even further than the formal constitutional structure 
contemplates.265 
ii. Formal Lobbying 
Subnational units in many federal states also attempt to influ-
ence the legislature through formal processes of lobbying little dif-
ferent from those employed by other interest groups.266 In these 
situations, employees of subnational units might register as lob-
byists and attempt to meet with legislators to inform them about 
and persuade them to support subnational interests and policy 
preferences.267 In the United States, for example, governors lobby 
Congress through organizations such as the National Governors 
Association, the Democratic Governors Association, and the Repub-
lican Governors Association.268 
To some extent, resorting to lobbying is a sign of a lack of subna-
tional influence within the national legislature, since presumably 
261. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], arts. 84, 85, 87, § 2, 87c, 87d, 91a, 91b, § 1, 96, 
§ 5, (Ger.). 
262. See BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBL No. 127/2009, as 
amended BGBL I No. 164/2013, art. 42 (Austria). 
263. Interview with subject 17, Austrian subnational government official (Jan. 21, 2015). 
264. See Langston, supra note 258, at 236-48. 
265. Interview with subject 27, German national government official (June 23, 2015). 
266. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Jensen, Governors and Partisan Polarization in the Federal Are-
na, 47 PUBLIUS 314, 314-16, 319-20 (2017). 
267. See id. 
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subnational governments would otherwise exploit exclusive, back-
channel avenues of communication and influence before resorting 
to a medium of influence in which they must compete on an equal 
footing with other supplicants for the time and attention of national 
legislators. The ubiquity of state lobbying offices and organizations 
in the United States,269 for example, may be testament to the 
effectiveness of the Seventeenth Amendment270 at weakening state 
control over U.S. Senators. 
iii. Influence Through Political Parties 
As noted earlier in the discussion of the work of Larry Kramer, 
political parties are one of the most significant and most ubiquitous 
vehicles in federal states for the transmission of subnational influ-
ence into the national legislature.271 Party connections can from 
time to time enable officials of subnational governments to call up-
on co-partisans in the national legislature to support measures and 
positions favored by the subnational government. For example, in 
the United States, governors are frequently in touch with members 
of their states’ congressional delegations,272 and expect to have at 
least some meaningful influence with members of the delegation 
who belong to the same political party.273 
269. Jensen, supra note 266, at 328-329. 
270. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
271. See supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text. 
272. DONALD H. HAIDER, WHEN GOVERNMENTS COME TO WASHINGTON: GOVERNORS, 
MAYORS, AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL LOBBYING 91-96 (1974) (describing gubernatorial lobbying 
of the state’s congressional delegation); Dinan, supra note 10, at 402-04. As Jensen observes, 
“[g]overnors are powerful people. They can pick up the phone and call senators [and] rep-
resentatives.” JENNIFER M. JENSEN, THE GOVERNORS’ LOBBYISTS: FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 
OFFICES AND GOVERNORS ASSOCIATIONS IN WASHINGTON 3 (2016). Routinized contacts may 
include monthly staff meetings of the state’s Washington office and chiefs of staff of all 
members of the state’s congressional delegation. See id. at 104-05. For more general dis-
cussion of the lobbying role and efforts of state leaders, see ANNE MARIE CAMMISA, GOV-
ERNMENTS AS INTEREST GROUPS: INTERGOVERNMENTAL LOBBYING AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
1-3 (1995); HAIDER, supra, at 91-96; NUGENT, supra note 10, at 118, 119 tbl.5; John Dinan, 
State Government Influence in the National Policy Process: Lessons from the 104th Congress, 
27 PUBLIUS 129 (1997). 
273. As Kramer observes, “Democrats give other Democrats consideration they deny to 
Republicans—just because they are Democrats. Republicans do the same.” Kramer, supra 
note 37, at 1539. “[P]arty connection establishes a bond that encourages government officials 
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In addition, party ties can provide a vector for informal subna-
tional influence when subnational officials hold leadership positions, 
whether formal or informal, in subnational party organizations. For 
example, in Argentina and the United States, state governors typ-
ically act as heads of the state-level affiliates of the national 
political parties to which they belong.274 This gives them considera-
ble influence in deciding how party resources will be deployed, in-
cluding how and in whose favor ground-level get-out-the-vote efforts 
will be conducted.275 This in turn allows them to command the at-
tention, and in many cases the loyalty, of candidates for the national 
legislature.276 
These tactics are available, however, only where political parties 
are sufficiently well-integrated to support appeals that cross juris-
dictional boundaries. Where party systems are highly fragmented, 
parties may not operate equally effectively—or at all—at different 
levels and so will be unable to successfully broker efforts at official 
coordination.277 For example, in Canada there is little functional 
overlap between parties operating at the provincial level and those 
operating at the national level, even when they share the same 
name.278 As a result, Canadian parties do not offer paths of political 
influence that cross constitutional lines of authority.279 In contrast, 
272, at 106 (describing difficulties of cross-party appeals). 
274. See Ardanaz et al., supra note 10, at 27-29; Leiras, supra note 207. 
275. Leiras, supra note 207, at 230-31. 
276. See Ardanaz et al., supra note 10, at 27-29. 
277. See Richard Simeon & Beryl A. Radin, Reflections on Comparing Federalisms: Canada 
and the United States, 40 PUBLIUS 357, 363 (2010) (noting that the complexities of the 
American system as compared to the Canadian system prohibit the former from single-table 
discussion). 
278. R. Kenneth Carty & Steven B. Wolinetz, Political Parties and the Canadian Feder-
ation’s Coalition Politics, in CANADA: THE STATE OF THE FEDERATION, 2002, supra note 212, 
at 57, 58; see also Herman Bakvis & A. Brian Tanguay, Federalism, Political Parties, and the 
Burden of National Unity: Still Making Federalism Do the Heavy Lifting?, in  CANADIAN 
FEDERALISM, supra note 82, at 112, 112; William M. Chandler, Federalism and Political 
Parties, in FEDERALISM AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE, supra note 172, at 149, 149, 151-54; 
Gibbins, supra note 233, at 24-27; Simeon & Radin, supra note 277, at 363; A. Brian Tanguay, 
Political Parties and Canadian Democracy: Making Federalism Do the Heavy Lifting, in 
CANADIAN FEDERALISM: PERFORMANCE, EFFECTIVENESS, AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 82, at 
296, 302-03. But see Anna Lennox Esselment, Fighting Elections: Cross-Level Political Party 
Integration in Ontario, 43 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 871, 877-80 (2010). 
279. SIMEON, supra note 187, at 31-35. Chhibber and Kollman attribute this to the strong 
decentralization of power in the system, that is, because the provinces have such significant 
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parties in Austria are so thoroughly nationalized that they have a 
tendency to induce a very strong convergence of national and sub-
national commitments.280 In practice, the dominance of the national 
parties is so strong that it actually inhibits the effective transmis-
sion of subnational policy preferences through the parties.281 For the 
most part, coordination runs the other way, with Länder govern-
ments falling into line with national policy commitments, and Land 
governors using their authority to implement policies set at the na-
tional level.282 In the United States, vertically integrated parties can 
serve as conduits for conveying subnational influence into the Con-
gress, but they also frequently serve as vectors for the communica-
tion of national party commitments to the state level.283 
iv. Mobilization of Popular Opinion 
Subnational units may also be able to exercise a form of informal 
influence on national legislative policy through mobilization of pop-
ular opinion. Where subnational officials command sufficient public 
loyalty, and where a custom exists of mass political action, it is pos-
sible for subnational officials to whip up popular support for subna-
tional interests and policy preferences that national election officials 
may have difficulty resisting. In Catalonia, for example, it is some-
times possible for government officials, often working in conjunction 
with their political parties, to put a million people in the street to 
protest actions taken or contemplated by the Spanish government.284 
whereas in more centralized systems they have incentives to vote their national preferences 
in subnational elections. See generally PRADEEP CHHIBBER & KEN KOLLMAN, THE FORMATION 
OF NATIONAL PARTY SYSTEMS: FEDERALISM AND PARTY COMPETITION IN CANADA, GREAT 
BRITAIN, INDIA, AND THE UNITED STATES (2004). 
280. Interview with subject 14, Austrian legal and political scholar (Jan. 20, 2015); In-
terview with subject 15, Austrian legal and political scholar (Jan. 20, 2015); Interview with 
subject 16, Austrian legal scholar (Jan. 21, 2015). 
281. Interview with subject 14, Austrian legal and political scholar (Jan. 20, 2015); In-
terview with subject 15, Austrian legal and political scholar (Jan. 20, 2015); Interview with 
subject 16, Austrian legal scholar (Jan. 21, 2015). 
282. Interview with subject 14, Austrian legal and political scholar (Jan. 20, 2015); In-
terview with subject 15, Austrian legal and political scholar (Jan. 20, 2015); Interview with 
subject 16, Austrian legal scholar (Jan. 21, 2015). 
283. See James A. Gardner, The Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism, Political Parties, and 
the National Colonization of State Politics, 29 J.L. & POL. 1, 1-2 (2013). 
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In the United States, governors and state legislatures have become 
adept at mobilizing press coverage, and on occasion have used their 
skills to stage theatrical events shaming or condemning nationally 
elected officials.285 
c. Influence on Legislative Outcomes Through the Executive 
Branch 
Because the national executive also participates in the national 
legislative process,286 it too can sometimes serve as a vector for sub-
national influence on legislative outcomes. One of the most common 
avenues to influence national legislation running through the na-
tional executive is the practice of intergovernmental consultation. 
In this process, national officials engaged in the development of poli-
cy proposals reach out to subnational units either to provide notice 
of and information about the contemplated proposal, thereby fur-
nishing the subnational unit with an opportunity to respond and 
react; or to solicit from counterparts at the subnational level their 
views to allow them to help shape the policy before development 
gets too far along. In some cases, such consultation is required by 
law. Under the Swiss Constitution, for example, the national ex-
ecutive must consult cantonal authorities “when preparing im-
portant legislation.”287 In other cases, as in Austria and Germany, 
that no demonstration in Spain has ever produced one million attendees, although a 2013 
demonstration in Barcelona may have come close, with nearly 800,000 participants. See Álex 
Grijelmo, Nunca hubo un millón, EL PAÍS (Spain) (Oct. 3, 2017, 12:10 AM), https://elpais.com/ 
elpais/2017/09/29/opinion/1506674781_614116.html [https://perma.cc/E3Y2-XU2B]. 
285. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 10, at 1278-80; John Dinan, How States Talk 
Back to Washington and Strengthen American Federalism, POL’Y ANALYSIS, Dec. 3, 2013, at 
5. For example, in 1994, state and local interest groups cooperated to mount “National 
Unfunded Mandates Day,” an event designed to publicize subnational officials’ displeasure 
with national policies that imposed regulatory burdens without providing funding to pay for 
state and local compliance. See NUGENT, supra note 10, at 74. Somewhat more formally, state 
legislatures have sometimes enacted laws or resolutions denouncing federal legislation they 
find objectionable. See id. at 64-66. These laws are not generally intended to have legal effect; 
they are intended to influence public opinion by expressing state disapproval in a highly 
visible way. See id. Targets of this form of state ire have included the USA Patriot Act, the 
REAL ID Act, the No Child Left Behind Act, and the Affordable Care Act. See id.; John Dinan, 
Contemporary Assertions of State Sovereignty and the Safeguards of American Federalism, 74 
ALB. L. REV. 1637, 1660-63, 1668 (2011). 
286. See, e.g., supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text. 
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consultation is simply an informal courtesy that professionals at the 
different levels extend toward one another.288 In principle, this pro-
cess is different from negotiation. Parties to a negotiation expect a 
process of mutual concession leading to agreement;289 parties who 
are consulted expect only to be heard. 
Another forum in which subnational units often have the oppor-
tunity to influence the content of national legislation is through the 
practice of ministerial-level contacts. In this practice, ministers and 
lower-level officials meet to discuss issues of common concern on the 
legislative agenda, to trade relevant information, and sometimes to 
work collaboratively to develop mutually acceptable policy solutions 
to shared problems. These meetings can be formal or informal, 
routine or ad hoc, and among higher or lower ranking executive 
officials. For example, a 1989 study in Germany found 330 federal-
Land commissions then in existence.290 In its most extreme form, 
subnational units can work through the national executive to exert 
influence on national lawmaking through the process, where it 
exists, of executive federalism. As the Canadian examples described 
earlier illustrate, processes of executive federalism can produce sig-
nificant pieces of landmark legislation through a process of con-
sultation and negotiation among executive branch officials at the 
national and subnational levels.291 
d. Influence on National Administration 
All the tools mentioned above that can be used by subnational 
units to influence national legislation through the executive 
branch—intergovernmental consultation, ministerial-level contacts, 
and executive federalism—can also be used to influence administra-
tion by the national government of national policies enacted into 
law. Consequently, if a subnational unit is unsuccessful at shaping 
(Switz.). 
288. See Anna Gamper, Republic of Austria, in 3 A GLOBAL DIALOGUE ON FEDERALISM: 
LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 71, 72 (Kayt Le 
Roy et al. eds., 2006); Interview with subject 27, German federal government official (June 
23, 2015). 
289. See, e.g., supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text. 
290. See ARTHUR GUNLICKS, THE LÄNDER AND GERMAN FEDERALISM 67 (2003). 
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national policy to its liking, it can still attempt to bend policy out-
comes in the directions it favors by using its influence in the ex-
ecutive branch to target implementation and administration of the 
disfavored policies. For example, in Italy, regional presidents may 
meet with national ministers to influence administrative decisions 
taken in that region.292 In the United States, subnational influence 
on national executive branch officials sometimes helps shape na-
tional administrative policy, as has been the case, for example, in 
the implementation of national health care programs.293 
3. Participation in Foreign Policy 
One last way in which subnational units may influence national 
policy is by participating in the formulation of foreign policy. This 
kind of influence seems to demonstrate the greatest possible extent 
of subnational integration into national policy making, as histori-
cally the formulation and execution of foreign policy has long been 
treated as the exclusive province of national governments.294 Today, 
however, it is increasingly common for subnational units in federal 
states to participate in the development and implementation of for-
eign policy, and even to conduct their own foreign relations on a 
limited scale.295 
In Switzerland, for example, the national government must by 
law consult the cantons on foreign policy decisions that affect their 
powers or interests, and where subnational powers are affected, 
“the Cantons shall participate in international negotiations in an 
appropriate manner.”296 Belgian subnational units (regions and 
292. Interview with subject 19, Italian legal and political scholar (Feb. 10, 2015); Interview 
with subject 20, Italian political scholar (Feb. 10, 2015). 
293. See Shanna Rose & Cynthia J. Bowling, The State of American Federalism 2014-15: 
Pathways to Policy in an Era of Party Polarization, 45 PUBLIUS 351, 358-62 (2015). 
294. Duchacek lists exclusive control over foreign affairs as one of ten “yardsticks” of fed-
eralism. See DUCHACEK, supra note 9, at 208. 
295. MICHAEL J.GLENNON &ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: THE MYTH 
OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY 35-36 (2016); Daniel Abebe & Azizz Huq, Foreign Affairs 
Federalism: A Revisionist Approach, 66 VAND. L. REV. 723, 769-71 (2013); David Criekemans, 
Regional Sub-State Diplomacy from a Comparative Perspective: Quebec, Scotland, Bavaria, 
Catalonia, Wallonia and Flanders, 5 HAGUE J. DIPL. 37, 37-38 (2010). 
296. See CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art. 55, 
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communities) have authority to make treaties with foreign states 
concerning matters within their competence.297 Consistent with 
European policy on regional affairs, Austrian Länder, Spanish co-
munidades autónomas, and Italian regioni participate in the for-
mation of national policy relating to the (EU), and subnational units 
in many EU member federations maintain lobbying offices in Brus-
sels.298 Austrian Länder have authority to make treaties with neigh-
boring states, though that power has never been used.299 American 
states and Canadian provinces often maintain relations with foreign 
states to promote trade. More recently, American governors seem to 
have been bypassing national diplomatic channels to deal directly 
with foreign leaders on issues of climate change and international 
trade.300 
D. Summary 
Perhaps the most notable finding of the foregoing account is that 
it provides broad confirmation of Madison’s prediction that subna-
tional units in federal states will from time to time assert them-
selves against national power.301 Indeed, the evidence shows that in 
some federal states, subnational units assert themselves regularly 
and with considerable effectiveness.302 In addition, the evidence 
reveals that all the tools of subnational influence identified by the 
theorists discussed in Part I—public protest, litigation, influence 
through a senate, and exploitation of political party channels303— 
have been used at one time or another by at least some subnational 
units in some federal states, and that some of those tools are used 
297. 2012 CONST. art. 167, § 3 (Belg.). 
298. See Stephen Weatherill, The Challenge of the Regional Dimension in the European 
Union, in THE ROLE OF REGIONS AND SUB-NATIONAL ACTORS IN EUROPE 1, 14-15 (Stephen 
Weatherill & Ulf Bernitz eds., 2005). 
299. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBL No. 127/2009, as amend-
ed by BGBL No. 164/2013, art. 16 (Austria). 
300. See Alexander Burns, Going Around Trump, Governors Embark on Their Own 




301. See supra notes 1-5, 37 and accompanying text. 
302. See supra Part II.A-C. 
303. See supra Part I.B. 
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quite widely, and often to good effect. More importantly, however, 
the data show that subnational units do not confine themselves to 
the small universe of tools of influence identified by federal theor-
ists. In fact—and strikingly so—subnational units in the federal 
states studied here have from time to time resorted to an enormous 
variety of methods to attempt to shape, influence, or thwart nation-
al policies. These tools of influence cover a broad range, from open 
defiance, to surreptitious undermining, to coordinated occupation of 
vacant policy space, to cooperative tactics such as negotiation and 
consultation.304 
Viewed as a whole, these techniques reveal a good measure of 
creativity on the part of subnational officials in devising methods 
by which to exert influence on national governments. Subnational 
officials have attempted to exploit virtually every conceivable 
opening by which to influence national policy-making processes.305 
Not all methods are used in every state, and some methods that are 
effective in some states are less effective when attempted in oth-
ers.306 However, the basic Madisonian hypothesis seems amply 
confirmed: subnational units in federal states do attempt to gain 
advantage by influencing national policy;307 they assert their own 
authority in areas where they possess autonomous control of poli-
cy;308 and they push back against periodic national incursions into 
subnational policy space.309 
III. CONTESTATION AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
STABILIZATION 
The findings presented in Part II raise a critical question about 
Madisonian federal theory: how do the routes of subnational influ-
ence identified above come into existence? The orthodox answer 
would seem to be that they are, indeed must be, provided by the con-
stitutional plan.310 On this view, designers consider the particular 
304. See supra Table 1. 
305. See supra Part II.A.-C. 
306. See, e.g., supra notes 277-83 and accompanying text. 
307. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
308. See supra Part II.B.1. 
309. See supra Part II.A. 
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balance they wish to achieve between national and subnational 
power, identify methods by which subnational units may influence 
national policy making, and create constitutional mechanisms to 
effectuate the plan311—what the United States Supreme Court has 
called a “finely wrought and exhaustively considered” division of 
powers.312 That account is clearly accurate in many cases. For 
example, where a second legislative chamber is involved, its 
existence and characteristics are indisputably a matter of deliberate 
constitutional design.313 But in many other cases identified in Part 
II, these routes to subnational influence appear to have been 
essentially conceived, manufactured, and deployed unilaterally by 
the subnational units that now use them.314 Certainly no federal 
constitution contemplates, for instance, that subnational units will 
influence national policy making through open and outright 
defiance of national law or the orders of a national court—indeed, 
some federal constitutions clearly forbid subnational defiance,315 or 
have been authoritatively so construed.316 
It seems to follow, then, that subnational units have developed at 
least some, and perhaps many, methods of influence through an 
improvisatory process of creative invention; they have developed 
new methods when they felt they needed them—when they felt 
existing methods did not offer them the degree of influence they 
desired. Yet, by developing new methods by which to exert influence 
in the national policy-making arena, subnational units are in effect 
altering the balance of power and influence contemplated by the 
initial constitutional plan.317 They are, in effect, changing the con-
stitutional design itself.318 
To put the problem a bit more vividly, we might ask whether 
intergovernmental struggle in federations is more like a boxing 
match, in which both participants move freely around the (constitu-
311. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
312. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
313. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I. 
314. See supra Part II.B.4. 
315. See, e.g., BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBL No. 127/2009, 
as amended by BGBL No. 164/2013, art. 22 (Austria); see also CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST] 
[CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art. 44 (Switz.). 
316. See PALERMO & KÖSSLER, supra note 7, at 249-53. 
317. See Gardner, supra note 16, at 336-37, 344-47. 
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tionally established) ring and stay there, or a bar brawl in an old 
Wild West film where the combatants start in the (constitutionally 
defined) bar, eventually crash through the window and out onto the 
front porch, break through the porch rail, and end up in the street. 
The evidence presented here is far from conclusive, but it is 
suggestive, and I believe it suggests the latter: the capacity of 
federal constitutions to constrain the behavior of officials who are 
engaged in a process of mutual struggle is limited.319 Because the 
goal of officials engaged in struggle is to do so successfully, officials 
have strong incentives to develop new, innovative, and, if necessary, 
extraconstitutional methods of attack and defense when they find 
the tools afforded them by the formal constitutional structure in-
sufficiently efficacious.320 In this sense, the evidence presented here 
provides support for the contention of many contemporary theorists 
of federalism, alluded to earlier,321 that “federal systems are per-
manently in motion,”322 and indeed that “competencies are always in 
motion, and in more than one direction.”323 
A. Subnational Tactics and the Processes of Constitutional 
Innovation 
It is perhaps most useful to conceive of the subnational tactics 
identified in Part II as lying along a spectrum of constitutionality. 
At one end are methods of contestation clearly approved by the 
relevant federal constitution; at the other extreme are methods 
clearly disapproved; and in between, very likely an extensive field 
of ambiguity in which the constitutionality of particular tactics 
cannot be easily determined.324 However, my purpose here is less to 
319. See supra Part II.D. 
320. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text. 
321. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text. 
322. See Benz & Broschek, Federal Dynamics: Introduction, in FEDERAL DYNAMICS, supra 
note 9, at 1, 2. 
323. Resnik, supra note 75, at 368 (emphasis added). Poirier and Saunders refer to this as 
“constitutional (re)engineering” and distortion of the “distribution of competences.” See 
Johanne Poirier & Cheryl Saunders, Conclusion: Comparative Experiences of Intergovern-
mental Relations in Federal Systems, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN FEDERAL SYS-
TEMS, supra note 10, at 440, 490-91. 
324. See supra Table 1. Here, judgments as to the constitutionality of any tactic will depend 
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characterize the constitutionality of these practices than to demon-
strate a persistent pattern of behavior: subnational officials have 
repeatedly created new opportunities to exert influence on national 
policy making by exploiting existing institutions and practices that 
may not have been intended by the constitutional scheme to serve 
as avenues of subnational influence, but with some imagination can 
nevertheless be made to do so.325 In some cases, to be sure, crea-
tively repurposing existing institutions and practices may press 
hard against or even overstep constitutional boundaries.326 The 
more important point, however, is the scope and persistence of the 
process of repurposing itself, and its long-term impact on the con-
stitutional structure of federalism. 
1. Influence by Constitutional Design 
Perhaps the most obvious route of subnational influence resulting 
from deliberate constitutional design is the type of influence sub-
national units wield through the institution of a second legislative 
chamber, or senate. Consider, for example, the very different struc-
tures of the German Bundesrat, the Austrian Bundesrat, and the 
Spanish Senado. 
The article of the German Basic Law establishing the Bundesrat 
opens with a strong declaration of constitutional intent: “[t]he 
Länder,” it provides, “shall participate through the Bundesrat in 
the legislation and administration of the Federation.”327 To effectu-
ate this principle, the Basic Law provides that members of the 
Bundesrat are to be “members of the Land governments,” appoint-
ed and recalled by those governments.328 This ensures that the 
Bundesrat is populated not by individuals who are merely sympa-
thetic or responsive to Land interests, but by members of the Land 
discretion that prevail in the state in question. For example, whether the federal state is a 
civil law or common law jurisdiction may influence the constitutional treatment of tactical 
innovation by government officials. See Thomas Fleiner, Discrepancies Between Civil Law and 
Common Law Federations, in 19 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 386, 406-07 
(Frauke Lachenmann et al. eds., 2015). 
325. See supra Part III.A. 
326. See supra Part III.A.2. 
327. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 50 (Ger.). 
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government itself, familiar with and fully committed to the advance-
ment of Land policy.329 In practice, for example, a Bundesrat del-
egation typically includes the two top executive officials of the Land, 
the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister.330 
The Basic Law expressly authorizes the Bundesrat to pursue 
Länder interests at the national level by two formal mechanisms. 
First, for any kind of law, the Bundesrat may exercise a suspensive 
veto that delays adoption of the law by referring it for consideration 
to a Joint Committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat.331 Following 
this period of delay, the Bundestag may reenact the law without 
further input from the Bundesrat.332 However, in many cases bills 
enacted by the Bundestag may not become law without the affirma-
tive consent of the Bundesrat.333 In these instances, the Bundesrat 
exercises an absolute veto over national laws, giving the Länder a 
degree of indirect control over national legislative policy unmatched 
by subnational units in any other federation. 
In Austria, as in Germany, the members of the Bundesrat are 
elected by the Land legislatures (Diets).334 However, the Austrian 
Bundesrat is considerably weaker than its German counterpart 
because it may, with very few exceptions, exercise only a suspensive 
veto,335 giving it the power only to delay rather than to obstruct 
federal legislation. Thus, although the members of the Austrian 
Bundesrat are in principle as closely tied to the Länder as in Ger-
many, the Austrian Constitution by design provides them with less 
influence in the federal legislative process than is the case under the 
German Constitution. 
329. See id. 
330. Interview with subject 24, German legal and political scholar (June 22, 2015). 
331. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 53a, 77 (Ger.). 
332. Id. art. 77, § 4. 
333. See, e.g., id. arts. 87, § 3, 87b, 87c, 87d, 91a, § 2, 91b, § 1, 96, § 5, 104a, §§ 4-6. In a 
significant 2006 reform, the constitution was amended to reduce the number of matters on 
which Bundesrat approval was required. See Arthur B. Gunlicks, Legislative Competences, 
Budgetary Constraints, and the Reform of Federalism in Germany from the Top Down and the 
Bottom Up, in CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS, supra note 199, at 61, 70-75; 
Ed Turner & Carolyn Rowe, Party Servants, Ideologues or Regional Representatives? The 
German Länder and the Reform of Federalism, 36 W. EUROPEAN POL. 382, 389-90 (2013). 
334. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBL No. 127/2009, as 
amended by BGBL No. 164/2013, art. 35 (Austria). 
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In Spain, the power of subnational units to exercise influence 
through the Spanish second chamber, the Senado, is even more 
attenuated. The Spanish Constitution defines the Senado as “the 
Chamber of territorial representation.”336 The territories repre-
sented, however, are not the principal subnational units, known as 
comunidades autónomas, or Autonomous Communities; they are 
instead “provinces,” which in Spain are subunits of Autonomous 
Communities.337 In the United States, this arrangement would cor-
respond roughly to one in which the U.S. Constitution guaranteed 
senatorial representation to counties rather than states. The Span-
ish Constitution does go on to authorize each Autonomous Commu-
nity to designate one senator, plus an additional senator for each 
million inhabitants it contains.338 However, the structure of these 
constitutional rules ensures that senators who directly represent 
the Autonomous Communities as Communities are far outnumbered 
by those representing individual provinces.339 The result is that the 
principal subnational units in Spain have extremely limited rep-
resentation in the Senado, making it a much less effective conduit 
for the exercise of subnational voice in the national legislative pro-
cess than is the case in Germany or Austria. 
Different as they are, what these structures of subnational in-
fluence have in common is that they were deliberately chosen by 
constitutional designers. When German or Austrian Länder or 
Spanish comunidades autónomas attempt to make use of their sec-
ond chambers as conduits for influencing national legislation, they 
are not merely working within constitutional bounds, but making 
use of institutions expressly designed for that purpose.340 The ef-
ficacy of the channel may differ from state to state, but there can be 
no doubt that use of these channels is specifically contemplated and 
authorized by the relevant constitutions. 
336. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 69, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). 
337. Id. n. 143, § 1. 
338. Id. n. 69, § 5. 
339. Fifty-eight out of the Senado’s 208 senators represent Autonomous Communities in 
their entirety rather than the smaller provinces of which they are composed. María Jesús 
García Morales & Xavier Arbós Marín, Intergovernmental Relations in Spain: An Essential 
but Underestimated Element of the State of Autonomies, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS, supra note 10, at 350, 355. 
340. That is, the constitutional design evinces an intention that the second chamber rep-
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The same might be said of several other mechanisms of subna-
tional influence. For example, when subnational units pursue their 
policy preferences by exercising independent powers allocated to 
them by constitutional grant, they are making use of avenues of 
influence and power projection that clearly fall within the bounds 
of what is contemplated by the constitutional scheme. Similarly, 
some federal constitutions expressly approve practices of intergov-
ernmental negotiation and bargaining. For example, the Swiss Con-
stitution instructs “[t]he Confederation ... [to] consult [the Cantons] 
if their interests are involved,”341 and provides that “[d]isputes be-
tween ... Cantons and the Confederation, shall, to the extent pos-
sible, be resolved through negotiation or mediation.”342 The Italian 
Constitution specifically authorizes bilateral negotiations between 
the central state and certain regions.343 Likewise, litigation in a con-
stitutional court, when permitted by the jurisdictional rules of the 
court, is by definition a constitutionally authorized means of sub-
national influence.344 Thus, subnational units making use of these 
and other, similar avenues of influence are clearly acting within 
constitutional bounds by employing tools of influence deliberately 
provided to them by the constitutional plan. 
2. Influence by Extraconstitutional Innovation 
It is equally clear, however, that some of the tools and methods 
of influence identified in Part II are deployed not only without af-
firmative constitutional authorization, but in violation of the con-
stitution.345 This is most clearly the case with the more defiant 
methods of subnational resistance described earlier.346 For example, 
with few exceptions,347 secession from a federal state is considered 
341. CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST][CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art. 45, para. 
2 (Switz.). 
342. Id. art. 44, para 3. 
343. Art. 116 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
344. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. 
345. See supra Table 1. 
346. See supra Part II.A.2. 
347. In Ethiopia, for example, secession is specifically authorized. ETH. CONST. art. 39, § 1 
(“Every Nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-
determination, including the right to secession.”). According to one study, secession is also 
expressly authorized in the constitutions of Liechtenstein, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sudan, 
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an unconstitutional act,348 and to threaten secession, or to engage in 
signaling by talking of secession, is thus to threaten or promote 
consideration of a direct violation of constitutional limitations. 
The same is true, almost by definition, of outright defiance of 
lawful exercises of national authority, whether by violent or passive 
means. Some constitutions state this expressly. For example, the 
Swiss Constitution provides: “[t]he Confederation and the Cantons 
shall collaborate, and shall support each other in the fulfillment of 
their tasks.”349 The Austrian Constitution provides: “[a]ll authorities 
of the Federation, the Läender, [and] the municipalities ... are 
bound within the framework of their legal sphere of competence to 
render each other mutual assistance.”350 In Belgium, Germany, 
Uzbekistan, Slovakia, and South Africa. Rivka Weill, Secession and the Prevalence of Militant 
Constitutionalism Worldwide, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 38), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3062925 [https://perma.cc/ 
8X5P-QXDS]. 
348. See, e.g., Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725-26 (1868) (the United States is “an 
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States. When, therefore, Texas became one 
of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation.”); Reference re Secession of 
Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶¶ 149-55 (Can.) (holding that Canadian provinces may not 
constitutionally secede from the Commonwealth by unilateral action). A 1996 study found 
that eighty-two of eighty-nine constitutions examined prohibited secession “under any 
circumstances.” PATRICK J. MONAHAN ET AL., COMING TO TERMS WITH PLAN B: TEN PRINCIPLES 
GOVERNING SECESSION 7 (1996). A more recent study finds that 85 percent of all national 
constitutions prohibit secession, and that prohibition is sometimes accomplished indirectly 
through eternity clauses and bans on secessionist political parties. See Weill, supra note 347, 
at 5. 
In Spain, recent events have shown that even to threaten secession, by holding a popular 
referendum to gauge public support for independence, is to act unconstitutionally. Rebecca 
Carranco & Jesús García, La justicia desmonta la organización del referéndum ilegal de 
Cataluña, EL PAÍS (Spain) (Sept. 21, 2017, 10:04 AM), https://elpais.com/ccaa/2017/09/20/ 
catalunya/1505885372_273143.html [https://perma.cc/LSS7-AJNW]. At this writing, the Span-
ish central government has treated Catalonia’s moves toward secession as a failure to fulfill 
its constitutional obligations sufficient to trigger the application of Article 155 of the Spanish 
Constitution, which allows the central government to “adopt measures necessary to enforce” 
compliance. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 115, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain); see also Raphael 
Minder, In Catalonia Crisis, Shared Blame for ‘a Difficult and Undesirable Situation’, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/world/europe/catalonia-spain-
carles-puigdemont-mariano-rajoy.html [https://perma.cc/22ZG-M4YV]. As King argued, at the 
very least, “the structure of [federal] governments is heavily weighted against [secession].” 
KING, supra note 18, at 109. 
349. CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art. 44, para. 
1 (Switz.). 
350. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESTEZ [B-VG][CONSTITUTION] BGBL No. 127/2009, as amend-
ed by BGBL No. 164/2013, art. 22 (Austria). 
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Italy, and Spain, a requirement of mutual cooperation between 
national and subnational governments has been judicially inferred 
from the constitutional scheme.351 And of course subnational de-
fiance of lawful national authority is inconsistent with the national 
supremacy clauses that are typical of federal constitutions.352 In 
these cases, then, subnational units have found it necessary or de-
sirable to attempt to advance their interests, or to resist unwanted 
exercises of national power, by resorting to tools and methods that 
are not only outside the contemplation of the federal constitution, 
but in direct violation of it. The contestants here have, so to speak, 
crashed through the window and out into the street. 
3. Influence by Innovative Exploitation of Constitutional 
Uncertainty 
Many—perhaps most—of the practices adopted by subnational 
units to exert influence on national policy making do not fall neatly 
within or without clearly identifiable constitutional boundaries.353 
Yet this is understandable, and in a sense predictable, precisely 
because of the novelty and unexpectedness of many of these prac-
tices. Indeed, constitutional improvisation by definition will often 
pose difficult issues of constitutionality.354 
Consider, for example, subnational exploitation of channels of 
influence created by political parties. With the exception of the 
United States Constitution, which notoriously fails to provide for or 
even to mention political parties,355 the constitutions of all the states 
in this study contemplate to some degree a role for political parties 
351. PALERMO & KÖSSLER, supra note 7, at 249-51; see also S.T.C., June 28, 2010 (B.J.C. 
No. 8045-2006) (Spain). 
352. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 31 (Ger.); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. 
353. As Nugent writes, “[t]he checks used most frequently by states are not necessarily 
ones that the framers of the Constitution anticipated or wrote about.” NUGENT, supra note 10, 
at 5. 
354. In an analogous situation, describing constitutional uncertainty in the distribution 
between executive and congressional power, Justice Jackson referred to such actions as 
occupying a “zone of twilight.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
355. The Framers feared and loathed political parties. In his Farewell Address, George 
Washington warned strongly against what he called “the baneful effects of the spirit of party.” 
Washington, supra note 53, at 172. 
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in the processes of democratic governance. In some cases, this role 
is substantial: the constitutions of Germany, Spain, and Switzer-
land, for example, all provide expressly that political parties “par-
ticipate in the formation of the political will of the people.”356 The 
constitutions of Austria and Argentina recognize a role for political 
parties in the formation of the national legislature through adoption 
of principles of proportional representation.357 It is probably fair to 
conclude from these kinds of provisions that constitutional designers 
in these states contemplated that political parties would perform 
the kinds of functions we normally expect parties to perform: de-
veloping policy programs, organizing political thought in civil soci-
ety, recruiting and supporting candidates, mobilizing voters, par-
ticipating in the formation of governments, and so forth.358 On the 
other hand, although it is now clear from experience that party ap-
paratuses also can be used by government officials as jurisdiction-
crossing back channels of political influence, there is no particular 
reason to think that designers intended them to be so used, or that 
designers even foresaw the practice as a possible adaptation of party 
structures intended primarily for other purposes.359 
A similar story might be told of many of the techniques of 
influence developed over the years by subnational officials. It was 
certainly to be expected, for example, that the constitutional allo-
cation of independent power to subnational units would provide 
them with opportunities to use those powers to satisfy policy pref-
erences within their own borders. It was not necessarily to be an-
ticipated, however, that subnational units would from time to time 
work together to develop policies jointly for the express purpose of 
establishing uniform national policies from below, through harmo-
nized adoption at the subnational level, without involvement of the 
356. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 21 ¶ 1 (Ger.); see CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST] 
[CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art. 137 (Switz.); CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 
6, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). 
357. Art. 99, § 3, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.); BUNDES-VERFASSUNGS-
GESETZ [B-VG][CONSTITUTION] BGBL NO. 127/2009, as amended by BGBL No. 164/2013, art. 
35 (Austria). 
358. See generally RUSSELL J. DALTON ET AL., POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIC 
LINKAGE: HOW PARTIES ORGANIZE DEMOCRACY (2011); NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF 
THE ANGELS: AN APPRECIATION OF PARTIES AND PARTISANSHIP (2008). 
359. See Kramer, supra note 46, at 268-270 (describing the Framers’ lack of anticipation 
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national government.360 Similarly, it might have been expected that 
subnational units in European states would attempt to participate 
in the domestic processes by which national policy relating to the 
EU is formed when permitted to do so by their national constitu-
tions.361 It might not have been anticipated, however, that subna-
tional units in these states would use this authority as the basis for 
establishing their own standing foreign policy apparatus, including 
permanent embassies in Brussels.362 
If these examples show a willingness by subnational officials to 
use existing institutions creatively, for purposes other than those for 
which they were originally or primarily intended, they do not nec-
essarily show subnational officials doing so in a way that pushes 
hard against constitutional boundaries. But that is not always the 
case. Consider again the institution of political parties. Let us sup-
pose that no constitutional doubts are raised when subnational 
officials detour around constitutionally provided tools of voice and 
influence by exploiting party back channels to communicate with 
and exert influence upon national policy makers. But what of prac-
tices of subnational extortion and clientelism effectuated via the 
party system? 
For example, as we have seen, in Argentina the official power of 
provincial governors is often augmented by their simultaneous pos-
session of informal power as heads of provincial political parties.363 
Governors sometimes are able to use their power as head of the 
party to decide who gets to run for seats in the national legislature, 
a power that permits them to demand loyalty and to extract benefits 
and concessions from national legislators for the advantage of their 
provinces.364 Governors thus pursue official goals through the use of 
360. See supra Part II.B.2. 
361. See  CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST.][CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1998, RO 101, art. 55 
(Switz.) (requiring central government consultation of cantons on matters that affect their 
interests); BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBL No. 127/2007, as 
amended by BGBL No. 164/2013, art. 23d, ¶ 1 (Austria) (requiring central government consul-
tation of Länder on matters arising in the European Union that affect their interests); Art. 
117 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). Such provisions are common among European states with 
regional governments following the EU’s 1994 creation of the Committee of the Regions to 
increase EU attention to developments affecting regional governments. 
362. See supra note 298 and accompanying text. 
363. See supra notes 206-07, 210-11 and accompanying text. 
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extraconstitutional power. This practice is certainly not contem-
plated by the Argentine Constitution, but does it cross a line into 
unconstitutionality? Strong voices in Argentina so contend.365 
Or consider the similar practice in the United States of governors 
and state legislatures disciplining and accumulating political debts 
from members of Congress in virtue of their authority to draw safe 
or competitive federal election districts.366 Again, this practice 
clearly is not contemplated by the U.S. Constitution, but does it 
cross any constitutional boundary? If not, it seems certainly to push 
hard against constitutional limits.367 To quote Professor Schatt-
schneider again, 
The extralegal character of political parties is one of their most 
notable qualities.... It is profoundly characteristic that the fun-
damental party arrangements are unknown to the law.... It is 
precisely through this breach in the rule of law that the parties 
... undertake to control the decisions of public authorities at the 
points at which the law cannot control them.368 
Perhaps the most dramatic example of constitutional rewriting 
encountered in Part II is the Canadian practice of “executive 
365. For example, the prominent Argentine scholar Antonio Hernandez has been a strong 
and persistent critic of this practice, which he associates generally with “hyperpresident-
ialism,” a deformation of the constitutional plan. See Antonio Maria Hernández, The Distri-
bution of Competences and the Tendency towards Centralization in the Argentine Federation, 
in DECENTRALIZING AND RE-CENTRALIZING TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS WITHIN 
FEDERAL COUNTRIES 71, 83, 89 (2010) (describing gubernatorial control of members of 
congressional delegation as part of a chain of transactions ultimately controlled by presidents, 
which weakens constitutionally established institutions such as Congress and the provinces); 
Antonio M. Hernández, Republic of Argentina, in 3 LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL 
GOVERNANCE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 7, 31 (Katy Le Roy et al. eds., 2006) (giving a similar 
account and describing it as “a shortfall in constitutional compliance”). Calvo has similarly 
denounced clientelism as a breach of “a clear distribution of competences between the federal 
and provincial governments.” Ricardo Ramírez Calvo, Sub-National Constitutionalism in 
Argentina: An Overview, 4 PERSP. ON FEDERALISM 59, 74 (2012). 
366. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text. 
367. To the extent this practice takes the form of partisan gerrymandering, a majority of 
the Supreme Court has found that it is subject to constitutional limits, though the content of 
those limits remains indeterminate. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (noting that though the plurality found gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable, 
five members of the Court disagreed). 
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federalism,”369 a process of policy making in which major decisions 
about national policy are made through intergovernmental nego-
tiations among the chief executives of the national and subnational 
governments.370 Nothing in the Canadian Constitution suggests 
remotely that this form of governance was contemplated by its 
drafters, by the British Imperial Parliament that enacted it, or the 
Canadian leaders who requested it; on the contrary, the Canadian 
Constitution makes the routine and conventional assumption that 
national policy in Canada would be made as it is elsewhere: in the 
deliberations of a broadly representative national legislature.371 
Executive federalism nevertheless emerged in Canada, but not as 
a principle of design; rather, as Ronald Watts has argued, it 
emerged as the logical but unanticipated consequence of two other 
constitutional choices: “the marriage of federal and parliamentary 
institutions.”372 
Three principal conditions have underwritten the rise of executive 
federalism in Canada. First, Canadian provinces exercise a very 
substantial degree of independent power, and the ability of the 
federal government to accomplish its objectives thus often depends 
upon provincial cooperation.373 Second, Canadian national and 
provincial governments all employ Westminster-style parliamentary 
institutions,374 a form of government that greatly concentrates 
power in the hands of the prime minister and cabinet.375 As a result, 
the Canadian Prime Minister and provincial Premiers can “deliver” 
their governments in a way that United States or Australian 
369. See supra note 230. 
370. As one commentator has put it, “[i]n Canada, intergovernmental relations have 
become the substitute for engagement through Parliament.” SMITH, supra note 231, at 93; see 
also RUSSELL, supra note 231, at 81 (“By the mid 1960s meetings of federal and provincial 
ministers and their expert advisers on virtually all topics became so numerous they were 
supplanting legislatures as the primary arena of Canadian policy making.”). 
371. This assumption is implicit in Part IV of the Canadian Constitution, which establishes 
the national parliament and vests in it the legislative powers of the commonwealth, and Art. 
91, which lays out the very significant powers of that body. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 
Vict., c 3 (U.K.), art. 91. 
372. RONALD L. WATTS, EXECUTIVE FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1 (1989).
373. See Herman Bakvis & Grace Skogstad, Canadian Federalism: Performance, 
Effectiveness, and Legitimacy, in  CANADIAN FEDERALISM, supra note 82, at 28; Papillon & 
Simeon, supra note 212, at 118; Warhurst, supra note 172, at 259. 
374. HOGG, supra note 163, at 189-91. 
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presidents and prime ministers cannot.376 Third, because the num-
ber of Canadian jurisdictions is small—one national government, 
ten provincial governments, and three territorial governments—the 
agreement of only fourteen individuals, a very manageable number, 
is required to make virtually any kind of national policy.377 Taken 
together, these conditions have created a system in which “the big 
issues of public policy have been settled in an elaborate system of 
intergovernmental accommodations presided over by the first min-
isters.”378 
The emergence of executive federalism in Canada in turn pre-
cipitated the creation of numerous other institutions of intergovern-
mental relations, including, most notably, a plethora of ministerial 
conferences and consultative processes,379 most of which, according 
to the author of Canada’s leading treatise on constitutional law, 
“depend upon informal arrangements which have no foundation in 
the Constitution, or in statutes, or in the conventions of parliamen-
tary government.”380 The emergence of executive federalism in Can-
ada, then, appears to be the result of a substantial rewriting of the 
constitutional scheme by Canadian government officials.381 In Can-
ada, ironically, this may not make the practice unconstitutional; 
Canadian constitutional law includes unwritten conventions,382 so 
any practice, if maintained long enough, may work its way to consti-
tutional status.383 Again, though, the main point is this: subnational 
376. Donald J. Savoie, Power at the Apex: Executive Dominance, in CANADIAN POLITICS 115, 
125 (James Bickerton & Alain-G. Gagnon eds., 5th ed. 2009). As the Supreme Court of Cana-
da has observed, “the reality of Canadian governance [is] that, except in certain rare cases, 
the executive frequently and de facto controls the legislature.” Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 
3 S.C.R. 199, ¶ 54 (Can.). 
377. Herman Bakvis & Douglas Brown, Policy Coordination in Federal Systems: Compar-
ing Intergovernmental Processes and Outcomes in Canada and the United States, 40 PUBLIUS 
484, 485 (2010). 
378. Carty & Wolinetz, supra note 278, at 66. 
379. As Russell puts it, “[b]y the mid 1960s meetings of federal and provincial ministers 
and their expert advisers on virtually all topics became so numerous they were supplanting 
legislatures as the primary arena of Canadian policy ... making.” Russell, supra note 231, at 
81; see also  BRUCE G. POLLARD, MANAGING THE INTERFACE: INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 
AGENCIES IN CANADA 7-14 (1986); Papillon & Simeon, supra note 212, at 120; Warhurst, supra 
note 172, at 261-63. 
380. HOGG, supra note 163, at 107. 
381. Cf. id. 
382. Id. at 12-13. 
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government officials in Canada, as elsewhere, appear to exercise 
continual vigilance for opportunities to improve the quality of their 
influence on national policy making, by whatever means happen to 
arrive at hand, and to seize those opportunities when they can. 
B. Contestatory Federalism and the Problem of Constitutional 
Wandering 
This brings us back finally to where we began—to the Madisonian 
concept of a self-maintaining constitutional equilibrium. For Mad-
ison, a permanent division of governmental power was essential to 
the protection of liberty.384 Human nature being what it is, “[t]he 
accumulation of all powers ... in the same hands,” he wrote, “may 
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”385 To prevent 
tyranny thus requires preventing excessive accumulations of power, 
and Madison hypothesized that an initial constitutional division of 
authority could be maintained permanently by institutionalizing 
a process of mutual contestation among officials holding partial 
power.386 
As we have now seen, Madison correctly predicted that a system 
of permanent contestation among government officials could be 
established with the introduction of federalism into the constitu-
tional plan. However, it is not clear from the evidence that the 
process of intergovernmental contestation thus summoned into 
being is capable of stabilizing the constitutional division of power at 
its initial design specifications—of keeping officials and govern-
ments, in Madison’s words, “in their proper places.”387 Rather, the 
evidence suggests that officials engaged in these struggles from time 
to time opportunistically conceive and deploy novel methods, some-
times of uncertain or doubtful constitutionality and sometimes 
clearly in contravention of the constitution, to enhance their ability 
to influence decisions taken at the other level—tactics to which they 
presumably resort when they find the existing set of tools of in-
fluence inadequate to their purposes (or in Madison’s terminology, 
384. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 357-59 (James Madison). 
385. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 1, at 336 (James Madison). 
386. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. 
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inadequate to their ambitions).388 Thus, although it seems that 
constitutions can successfully initiate processes of official checking 
and contestation,389 it is less certain that constitutions can subse-
quently confine the ensuing contestation to an arena of struggle 
contemplated by the initial constitutional scheme.390 
This conclusion, if correct, issues a strong challenge to the 
Madisonian theory of contestatory federalism. Can the theory sur-
vive? In this section, I take up briefly two possible responses. First, 
it may be possible to stiffen Madison’s theory against this challenge 
by reconceiving it as acting on a longer time horizon—that is, by 
thinking about constitutional stabilization as something that 
happens not in the short term, but over long periods of time. Second, 
it is possible to understand the evidence as confirming the hypothe-
sis of some theorists that interventionist judicial review is the only 
way to create a truly sustainable and liberty-protective balance 
between national and subnational power. Ultimately, however, both 
of these responses suffer from serious weaknesses. 
1. Expansion of the Time Horizon 
The evidence adduced in Part II seems to show that processes of 
intergovernmental contestation do not, contrary to Madison’s pre-
diction, stabilize the constitutional division of powers at their initial 
design parameters, at least over the short term. It does not neces-
sarily follow, however, that such a system is incapable of doing so 
over a longer temporal horizon. On this view, even if consistent 
adherence to a specific constitutional equilibrium is impossible to 
sustain in the short term, it might nonetheless be maintained over 
a longer period if certain conditions obtain. In particular, if any 
given tactical move by national or subnational governments tempor-
arily throws off the constitutionally prescribed balance of power,391 
we cannot necessarily rule out the possibility that countermoves by 
other players eventually will bring things back to where they 
388. See supra Part III. 
389. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. 
390. See supra note 353 and accompanying text. 
391. See, e.g., Minder & Kingsley, supra note 91 (discussing the Spanish Senate’s decision 
to grant the Prime Minister power to “seize direct administrative control over the region and 
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belong. In this sense, the balance of power between levels of 
government may indeed, as some theorists have contended, be “per-
manently in motion,”392 but, if that motion orbits what we might call 
a fixed constitutional center of gravity, even if it does so slowly, the 
system will remain in rough balance over the long term and will 
thus be sustainable. 
Although this is in many ways an appealing modification, the 
concept of a moving yet self-maintaining constitutional equilibrium 
raises many difficulties. First, it is not clear why or under what 
conditions a process of perpetual contestation would produce a 
large-scale “orbital” pattern with the necessary self-stabilizing 
characteristics. It seems equally possible that a steady stream of 
constitutional perturbations would result either in continuous linear 
movement away from a fixed constitutional anchor point, or largely 
random movement in unpredictable directions, such that any return 
to the starting point would be more a matter of coincidence than the 
fulfillment of the constitutional plan. The physical analogy, in other 
words, may have limits; there is no physics of human behavior. 
Second, determining the actual path and direction of constitu-
tional change poses significant epistemological problems. It is ex-
tremely difficult to compare allocations of authority between na-
tional and subnational levels at different points in time.393 Even 
when divisions of power remain stable, the utility of any particular 
power—and thus its practical significance—is largely a matter of 
context, depending greatly on the contingent political salience of 
matters to which the exercise of that power might be relevant. The 
authority of American states to validate same-sex marriage, for 
example, was worthless in 1910, but it was extremely valuable in 
2010. Between those two points in time, nothing changed in the 
actual constitutional assignment of power. Instead, a change in the 
political context made a particular subnational power more im-
portant and salient than it had been before, in turn altering the 
balance of power between the levels of government, at least re-
specting this particular issue, thereby contributing to a significant 
reversal of the position of the U.S. national government.394 
392. Benz & Broschek, supra note 73, at 2. 
393. See supra notes 122-43 and accompanying text. 
394. In 1996, Congress came down strongly against same-sex marriage by declaring 
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Did this alteration contribute to the restoration of a constitution-
ally prescribed balance of power, or did it work a deviation from a 
constitutionally desirable equilibrium point? It is extremely difficult 
to say in some non-arbitrary way. And if it is difficult to make judg-
ments about the effect on the balance of power of changes caused by 
fluctuations in the political context while the intergovernmental al-
location of powers remains fixed,395 surely it is even more difficult 
to assess the impact of changes to the balance of power from actual 
expansion or contraction of powers resulting from clashes arising in 
the course of intergovernmental contestation. 
Third, to create a constitution capable of producing stability over 
very long periods while absorbing—without serious risk to the sys-
tem—an endless series of short-term shifts in power allocations 
would require a remarkable feat of constitutional foresight and 
engineering. Indeed, it seems doubtful that such a feat is humanly 
possible. The average lifespan of all world constitutions before they 
are replaced—not amended: replaced—is only nineteen years.396 
This suggests strongly that there are severe limits to the ability of 
constitutional designers to foresee and provide adequately for 
changing conditions.397 If constitutions containing contestatory 
institutions endure for long periods of time, it may be excessively 
optimistic to attribute any long-term stabilization to conscious con-
stitutional design; other social and political forces may well play 
more important roles. 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.” Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. 
L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 
(2013). This brought its position into line with an earlier ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court 
sustaining the validity of laws criminalizing homosexual sex. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). An extraordinary 
campaign of opposition in the states eventually galvanized the federal government’s repu-
diation of its earlier position. The Supreme Court overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 578 (2003); the executive branch decided it could no longer defend DOMA in 2011; 
and the U.S. Supreme Court struck it down in United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 
(2013). For fuller accounts, see generally LOVE UNITES US: WINNING THE FREEDOM TO MARRY 
IN AMERICA (Kevin M. Cathcart & Leslie J. Gabel-Brett eds., 2016). 
395. See supra notes 394-95 and accompanying text. 
396. ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 2 (2009). 
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2. Judicial Review as a Stabilizing Device 
The evidence reported here supports the conclusion that actors in 
federal systems will, if left to their own devices, eventually yield to 
the temptation to cheat by altering their behavior and practices in 
ways that are outside the contemplation of the constitutional 
plan,398 and that, by hypothesis, poses a danger to its long-term 
stability and success. Some theorists of federalism have long taken 
the view that, in consequence, a stabilizing hand must be supplied 
by an impartial arbiter, whose role is to interpret and enforce the 
prescribed constitutional division of power against this kind of 
opportunistic misbehavior, and that this function is best performed 
by a constitutional court.399 On this view, a constitutional court will, 
through intervention as necessary, restrain the enthusiasm of the 
contestants, maintain the constitutionally prescribed balance of 
power, and prevent either side in the conflict from accumulating an 
amount of power that might prove dangerous.400 
Although this solution is highly conventional—nearly every 
federal system in the world makes use of a supreme or specialized 
constitutional court to serve this function401—it is not without dif-
ficulty. The success of judicial review in this context depends fun-
damentally on the concept of judicial “impartiality”; to perform the 
necessary stabilization function, a court must interpret and enforce 
the constitutional balance accurately and free from bias.402 Yet there 
are reasons to doubt that constitutional courts are capable of mak-
ing decisions about the proper division of authority between levels 
of government with the required degree of impartiality. 
Scholars of comparative federalism have long contended that con-
stitutional courts in federal states exhibit a pronounced tendency to 
favor national over subnational power when put to the choice. As 
the Canadian scholar Peter Russell recently wrote, “[t]here is a 
398. See BEDNAR, supra note 77, at 8-9. 
399. See supra notes 42-45; see also Patricia Popelier, Federalism Disputes and the 
Behavior of Courts: Explaining Variation in Federal Courts’ Support for Centralization, 47 
PUBLIUS 27, 29-31 (2017). 
400. See Popelier, supra note 399, at 29-31. 
401. Ethiopia’s highest court lacks the authority to adjudicate disputes over the allocation 
of powers between levels of government. Id. at 28. Switzerland’s high court can adjudicate the 
constitutionality of subnational law, but not national law. Id. 
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natural tendency for the highest courts in federal countries to have 
a centralist bias.”403 Constitutional courts are, after all, organs of 
the national government, so the vantage point from which they 
survey the constitutional terrain is not necessarily one that offers 
a neutral view.404 Constitutional court judges typically owe their 
appointments to national officials.405 They tend to live in the na-
tional capital, where they absorb “the central government’s per-
spective on the powers it needs in order to govern effectively.”406 A 
recent study of eleven high courts in federal states concluded that 
nine of them show a “predominant leaning ... that ... has been uni-
tarist.”407 Another recent study of a slightly different group of high 
courts concluded that more than half of the courts studied incline 
toward “a centralist stance,” and that “no court takes an obviously 
marked decentralist stance.”408 
An entirely different factor that might apply pressure to the 
impartiality of constitutional courts when it comes to decisions 
concerning the federal allocation of power is that constitutional 
courts are themselves players in a separation-of-powers game at the 
national level in which they contend against the national legislative 
and executive branches for influence over national policy.409 In these 
contests, courts may wish to defend their own turf against encroach-
ments from national legislative and executive officials.410 
This dynamic is relevant here because judicial rulings concerning 
the constitutional distribution of authority between the national and 
subnational levels can have significant implications for the power 
of the national executive and legislative branches. Deciding that a 
403. See Peter H. Russell, Foreword to COURTS IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES: FEDERALISTS OR 
UNITARISTS?, at vii-viii (Nicholas Aroney & John Kincaid eds., 2017); see also  HUEGLIN & 
FENNA, supra note 7, at 311. 
404. See Russell, supra note 403, at viii. 
405. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (nomination by president, confirmation by senate); 
Art. 99, § 4, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.) (same); GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC 
LAW], art. 94 (Ger.) (appointment by Bundestag and Bundesrat). The judges of Canada’s 
Supreme Court are appointed by the federal cabinet. HOGG, supra note 163, at 170. 
406. Russell, supra note 403, at viii. 
407. Nicholas Aroney & John Kincaid, Comparative Observations and Conclusions, in 
COURTS IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES, supra note 403, at 482, 485. 
408. Popelier, supra note 399, at 32. 
409. This is merely the Madisonian theory of horizontal separation of powers as spelled out 
in THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48, 51 (James Madison). 
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power rests with the national legislature rather than with state 
legislatures, for example, may increase the policy reach, authority, 
and political salience of the national legislature as compared to the 
national judicial branch. In circumstances in which the judicial and 
legislative branches may compete for influence within some par-
ticular policy arena, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that a 
court’s federalism jurisprudence could be influenced by its ambitions 
in processes of horizontal contestation at the national level.411 
Conversely, as David Landau has recently argued, weakness in 
other branches of the national government may create conditions in 
which it may be difficult for constitutional courts effectively to 
assert judicial power as a means of “closing off routes for evasion” 
of constitutional structural provisions.412 This is not to say that 
constitutional courts may not in many circumstances issue balanced 
rulings aimed at preventing drift from a constitutionally prescribed 
allocation of powers among levels of government. It is to say, 
however, that the utility of constitutional courts as instruments of 
long-term constitutional stability may be quite limited. 
CONCLUSION 
Madisonian theory holds that a federal division of power is nec-
essary to the protection of liberty, but that federalism is a naturally 
unstable form of government organization that is in constant danger 
of collapsing into either unitarism or fragmentation.413 Despite its 
inherent instability, this condition may be permanently maintained 
in federal states, according to Madison, through a constitutional 
design that keeps the system in equipoise by institutionalizing a 
form of perpetual contestation between national and subnational 
governments and officials.414 How that contestation actually occurs, 
however, and by what specific means, remain unspecified by the 
theory. Moreover, in modern federal states, where the national 
411. See, e.g., Antoni Abat I Ninet & James A. Gardner, Distinctive Identity Claims in 
Federal Systems: Judicial Policing of Subnational Variance, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 378, 406-08 
(2016). 
412. David Landau, Political Support and Structural Constitutional Law, 67 ALA. L. REV. 
1069, 1071 (2016). 
413. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. 
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government almost invariably seems to have significant advantages 
of size, population, resources, and public loyalty and identification, 
it is not entirely clear how subnational units could possibly struggle 
with any success against national power. 
This study investigates these questions by examining and col-
lecting from nine federal states the methods actually deployed on 
the ground by subnational units to influence national policy making 
and to resist, undermine, or thwart exercises of national power with 
which the subnational unit disagrees. The evidence shows that 
subnational units engage in a very wide range of tactics, and that 
subnational units in many states resort to a great variety of meth-
ods and techniques to influence the substance of national policies 
and actions. These tactics range anywhere from outright defiance— 
and even the threat of secession—all the way to cooperative and 
highly integrated techniques such as voluntary consultation and 
negotiation.415 
Most importantly, the evidence shows that subnational units en-
gage in a pattern of creative invention by devising tools by which to 
exert influence at the national level, and sometimes the tools of 
influence so deployed lie outside the bounds of constitutionally con-
templated methods of intergovernmental contestation. By engaging 
in these tactics, subnational units in essence alter the constitution-
ally prescribed balance of power that underwrites the federal state, 
at least in the short term, with consequences that are difficult to 
analyze and very likely impossible to predict. This dynamic casts 
doubt on the Madisonian premise that constitutions can, through 
careful engineering, be made to stabilize themselves at their initial 
design specifications. Indeed, it casts doubt on the possibility that 
constitutions are really capable of constraining official power for any 
significant length of time. A constitution may well be capable of 
launching a journey, but thereafter the direction and quality of that 
journey may be determined more by those in charge at any parti-
cular moment than by the commands of the constitution. 
415. See supra Table 1. 
